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INTRODUCTION
Ritz Travel is a travel agency catering to celebrities, important
diplomats, and executives in key positions at several Fortune 500
companies.' To provide a level of service that will attract such
clientele, the travel agency has implemented several policies and
procedures governing its employees' conduct. Included in these
procedures is a strict rule of confidentiality that prohibits any
employee from discussing the travel plans of a client with anyone
outside the agency. Due to its policies, Ritz Travel has been
remarkably successful for a number of years.
While watching the news at home one day, Matt Pilfer, an
employee at Ritz, learned that Flight 97, a transcontinental
flight from Armond, New York to Los Angeles, had just crashed and
that there were no survivors. Pilfer immediately recalled that he
had ticketed Lou Gerstner, Chairman and CEO of IBM, on that
flight. Pilfer happened to own thirty shares of IBM. Realizing that
'This hypothetical, while completely fictional, is based on a compendium of cases
decided under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act"), Ch. 404,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811
(1994)).
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
IBM's stock would probably drop in response to the death of
Gerstner, Pilfer rushed to the phone to contact his broker before
the flight's passenger list was publicly announced. Pilfer placed an
order to sell all thirty shares of IBM. After the public announce-
ment that Lou Gerstner had died, IBM stock dropped $10 per
share.
Adam Skinner, a portfolio manager, happened to be at the
airport the day Lou Gerstner boarded Flight 97. Skinner immedi-
ately recognized Gerstner and wondered why he would be traveling
to Los Angeles. Always alert to potential market developments,
Skinner noted Gerstner's flight number and destination. Upon
learning that Flight 97 had crashed, and speculating that the price
of IBM stock would fall, Skinner immediately placed orders for his
own account and the accounts of several customers to sell IBM
short.2  Skinner made profits and commissions in excess of
$100,000 on the sale.
Under the matrix of current securities regulation, have Pilfer
and Skinner violated any securities laws? The answer, perhaps
surprisingly, is that although both traded on the same information,
Pilfer, the travel agent, has engaged in insider trading while
Skinner, the securities analyst, has not.
During the 1980s, insider trading violations' became more
numerous and more public. The highly publicized prosecutions of
such notable figures as Ivan Boesky, Dennis Levine, and Ilan Reich
made "insider trading" a household term.4 In 1988, the General
2 Short selling occurs when an investor borrows stock from a broker with a
promise to pay back the same amount of stock. The investor then sells the stock on
the market at today's price. If the price of the stock declines, then the investor pays
the broker back with stock that is worth less than that which was borrowed. The
investor makes a profit as the stock price declines because the profit is the difference
between the price at which the investor sold the stock and the price at which stock
is purchased to repay the broker. See LOUIS Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITY REGULATION 699-700 (3d ed. 1995).
' The term "insider trading" has never been explicitly defined in the federal
securities laws. Congress deliberated over whether to include a definition in the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, but ultimately determined that the existing
substantive law, as developed by the courts, was adequately clear. See Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-39
(1984). Additionally, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commis-
sion") determined that fashioning a definition of insider trading would be "too
daunting a task." Karl Groskaufmanis, The SEC's Enforcement Nose Dive, LEGAL TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1991, at 21, 22. The concern was that any definition would limit the
Commission's enforcement powers when responding to future unanticipated
situations. See id.
" Ivan Boesky, an arbitrageur who traded illegally on the basis of inside
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Accounting Office reported that the number of opportunities for
insider trading had sharply increased.5 Although Congress,' the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"),
7
information obtained through bribes, was allegedly fined $100 million by the SEC.
See Steven Brill, Can Boesky's Sweetheart Plea Bargain Be Undone, AM. LAW., Dec. 1987,
at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Amlawr File. Dennis Levine, a former
executive at the now defunct investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert,
paid $11.6 million in a settlement with the SEC in which Levine pled guilty to insider
trading charges. See Barbara Bradley, Feds Unleash Half of Assault on Drexel, CHRISTIAN
ScI. MONITOR, Sept. 19, 1988, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File;
George L. Fleming, A Decade of Debt and Greed: Roaring '80's Draws Unsettling
Parallels, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1988, at 15 (book review), available in
LEXIS, Regnws Library, Flnws File. Ilan Reich, one member of Levine's inner circle
and a partner at the prestigious New York Law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz, supplied inside information to Levine on pending deals. See id. Reich never
accepted any money for the information that he divulged to Levine. See id.
Nevertheless, Reich ended up paying $485,000 in civil penalties and serving 366 days
in prison with five years probation, ruining a career in which he was earning $500,000
per year at the age of 32. See id.
5 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES REGULATION EFFORTS TO DETECT,
INVESTIGATE, AND DETER INSIDER TRADING 3 (1988) (describing the large number of
corporate events, such as mergers and acquisitions, and the large number of people
with knowledge of those events as presenting opportunities for huge profits as a
result of trading on inside information).
6 Regulation of insider trading at the federal level began with the passage
of § 16(b) of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p (1994) (regulating short-swing
trading by insiders and requiring disgorgement to the corporation of any profits
acquired from such trading). Until 1961, when the Commission developed Rule
lOb-5, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995), § 16(b) constituted the sole federal
regulation of insider trading. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient
Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309,
319 (1989) (discussing intensified efforts to repeal § 16(b) after the development
of Rule 10b-5). The provision narrowly defines an insider as a holder of 10% of a
corporation's shares or as a director or an officer of a corporation. See Exchange
Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a). The definition of persons subject to regulation
under insider trading statutes today has been significantly broadened. See infra part
II.C.
More recently, Congress acted again to regulate insider trading in the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) and the Insider Trading and Securi-
ties Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, sec. 5, § 20A, 102 Stat.
4677, 4680 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994)) (amending the
Exchange Act).
7 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, .14e-3 (1995) (promulgating Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Rule IOb-5 proscribes the use of any
manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. This language encompasses unauthorized trading on the basis of material
nonpublic information. Rule 14e-3 regulates securities transactions in the context of
a tender offer.
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
and the Stock Exchanges' have addressed the problem numerous
times, insider trading continues to be pervasive.
In 1993, Robert Freeman, a former Goldman Sachs executive,
agreed to disgorge $1.1 million in profits obtained in transactions
involving the leveraged buyout of Beatrice Companies. 9  His
transactions were allegedly based on material nonpublic informa-
tion.1" The SEC also successfully litigated an action against Martin
Sloate, a stockbroker who purchased securities on the basis of tips
he received from a psychiatrist who was treating the wife of Sanford
Weill, then CEO of Shearson Loeb Rhodes." In the widely
publicized case against "Crazy Eddie" Antar,12 the SEC recovered
more than $8 million that Antar had held illegally outside the
United States."3 The SEC also recovered additional funds that
Antar had tried to shelter in the names of his wife and children. 4
The SEC, in testimony before Congress, alleged that in one case an
individual was able to realize a $430,000 profit in forty-eight hours
by purchasing approximately $3000 in call options of a corporation
that would later be the subject of a takeover proposal.15
These examples illustrate the heavy sanctions levied against
inside traders and the continuing practice of engaging in insider
trading notwithstanding its illegality. According to the results of
one study, a certain number of inside transactions accompany all
material corporate events, dramatically affecting the price of
companies' stock.16 Even given the tremendous potential for
personal liability, however, "the law concerning the trading of
8 See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 202.01-202.06,
307.00, 309.00 (1983 & Supp. 10 1995); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY
GUIDE 4-2 to 4-10 (1992) (discussing exchange disclosure policies).
' See Freeman, SEC Litigation Release No. 13663, 1993 WL 190409, at *1 (June
7, 1993).
'o See id.
" See SEC v. Willis, 825 F. Supp. 617, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that trading
on such information constitutes a Rule 10b-5 violation). For a further discussion of
this case, see infra notes 360-83 and accompanying text.
12 SEC v. Antar, 831 F. Supp. 380, 397 (D.NJ. 1993) (finding that Antar
wrongfully sold his company's stock after he had personally caused the company's
financial results to be fraudulently overstated).
13 See id. at 401-02.
14 See id. at 403.
15 See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS
ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2278.
" See generally Arthur S. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and
Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36J. FIN. 855 (1981) (discussing
evidence of excess returns earned by investors in acquired firms prior to mergers).
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securities on the basis of [inside] information is unsettled because
the applicable statutes and cases have failed to define clearly who is
prohibited from trading." 17 Admittedly, insider trading is difficult
to define comprehensively, but the term is probably best described
as "the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of material, non-
public information.""s While the traditional vision of insider
trading involves an insider to a corporation 9 trading on informa-
tion that is not available to the public, noninsiders20 are also
inclined to attempt to profit by trading on the basis of material21
nonpublic information.
22
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC in 1942 as an exercise of
the rulemaking power granted by section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 23 is the basic federal
"' Carlos J. Cuevas, The Misappropriation Theory and Rule lOb-5: Deadlock in the
Supreme Court, 13J. CoRP. L. 793, 794-95 (1988).
18 C. EDWARD FLETCHER, MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 3 (1991).
19 A corporate insider is defined by § 1603(b) of the Federal Securities Code as:
(1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person controlling, controlled
by, or under common control with, the issuer, (3) a person who, by virtue
of his relationship or former relationship to the issuer, knows a material fact
about the issuer or the security in question that is not generally available,
or (4) a person who learns such a fact from a person within § 1603(b) ...
with knowledge that the person from whom he learns the fact is such a
person.
FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(b) (American Law Inst. Supp. 1981).
" The term "noninsider" encompasses both quasi-insiders and outsiders. A quasi-
insider is a person who obtains confidential information from a corporation because
of a relationship of trust and confidence between the quasi-insider and the
corporation. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). Examples of quasi-
insiders include underwriters, attorneys, accountants, engineers, and consultants to
a corporation. See id.
Outsiders generally are under no obligation to refrain from trading on the basis
of material nonpublic information or to disclose such information unless some other
confidential or fiduciary relationship exists. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 239 (1980).
1 Material information is that which a reasonable investor would consider
important in making an investment decision. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
' See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222; SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 778 F.
Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). For a discussion of these cases, see infra parts II.B and
II.C.
23 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 10(b) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange ...
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
antifraud provision used to regulate the securities markets.24
Throughjudicial interpretation, the courts have expanded the scope
of Rule 10b-52 5 to the point that it is now referred to as the "catch-
all"26 provision for fraud. The courts and the SEC have broadened
application of the rule even further, however, to regulate not only
fraudulent practices in securities transactions, but also all trading on
the basis of material nonpublic information where no fraud has
occurred.2' As Rule lOb-5 does not itself define insider trading or
even specifically outlaw it, the courts and the Commission have felt
free to find liability in situations that offend notions of fair play,
where no other theory on which to base a remedy is available.
28
The basis for liability under Rule 10b-5 was founded upon com-
mon law notions of fraud. 29  At common law, silence regard-
ing facts that were not available to another party was not considered
fraud unless the first party had a duty to speak that arose out of a
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.
24 See Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception By Securities Professionals, 61 TEX.
L. REV. 1247, 1292 (1983).
2' Rule 10b-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
26 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,203 (1976) (noting that a spokesman
for the drafters of Rule 10b-5 "rightly" described the section as a "catchall" clause).
17 See infra part II.B.
" See Edmund W. Kitch, A Federal Vision of Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REV. 857,
859-62 (1984).
' See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980). At common law a
fraud or deceit action typically required proof of (1) a misrepresentation, (2)
"scienter" with regard to the falsity of the representation, (3) intent to induce reliance
on the misrepresentation, (4)justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff, and (5)
damage that was proximately caused by the reliance. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984).
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special relationship or unless other special facts were present.
30
Accordingly, courts traditionally required a breach of a fiduciary
duty or similar relationship before liability for trading on the basis
of material nonpublic information would attach.31 Strict adher-
ence to such a requirement, however, would allow outsiders who
have no fiduciary duty or relationship of trust that extends to the
corporation to trade in the market on material nonpublic informa-
tion.
To address this problem, federal prosecutors and the courts
developed the misappropriation theory, asserting that investor
confidence in the integrity of the securities markets can be
maintained only if Rule 10b-5 is broadly interpreted. 32  The
misappropriation theory does not require that the purchaser or
seller of securities be defrauded. Instead, the theory states that "a
person violates § 10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or converts
to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities." s3 It is under
this theory that Matt Pilfer in the opening hypothetical was indicted
for insider trading. Pilfer breached a duty to his employer, Ritz
Travel, by using confidential information, properly obtained in the
course of his employment, improperly as a basis for his trades and
thereby violated Rule 10b-5.
Part I of this Comment discusses the operation of the securities
markets and the theoretical effects of insider trading on those
markets. Using this background, Part I explores the principles that
have driven the development and application of laws regulating the
securities markets. Part II analyzes the legislative, regulatory, and
judicial development of traditional insider trading laws. It then
discusses the divergence between traditional insider trading laws as
implemented and the rationales that they purport to satisfy. Part II
also examines how courts have attempted to align the principles
behind the regulation of the securities markets with the laws as
implemented by applying a new theory of liability-the misappropri-
ation theory. The use of the misappropriation theory and why it is
ineffectual as a weapon in the SEC's and Justice Department's
SO See Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 51 (1995).
SI See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (holding that there can be no duty to disclose if
the person who traded on material nonpublic information was "not [the
corporation's] agent, ... was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the
sellers had placed their trust and confidence").
S2 See id. at 235-36.
" Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring).
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
arsenals in their attack on insider trading is then explained. Part III
proposes that the SEC adopt a new regulatory rule that will abolish
application of the misappropriation theory. The new rule will
instead structure the regulation of the securities markets in a way
that addresses the harms of insider trading and yet seeks to ensure
that capital markets remain efficient. Such a rule would not focus
on the source of the information, as courts do when they apply the
misappropriation theory, but would instead clearly define those
people who are prohibited from trading on the basis of material
nonpublic information, eliminating the confusion of the current
system.
I. THE FUNCTIONS AND MECHANISMS OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS
AND THE CORRESPONDING EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING
A. Efficient Capital Markets?
An analysis of basic market theory is necessary to understand
the perceived harms of insider trading. This understanding is
important because the courts and the Commission have provided
remedies based upon these perceived harms to shield investors from
those who trade illegally on the basis of nonpublic information.
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis ("ECMH") is a theory that
provides a foundation for many of the arguments that insider
trading is in fact a harmful activity. The ECMH provides that "in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company's
stock is determined by the available material information regarding
the company and its business."3 4 For example, if a share of Pepsi
Co. is trading for $36, that price is the true value of Pepsi Co. given
all information known about Pepsi Co.'s business prospects and
growth opportunities. As long as there are a sufficient number of
investors analyzing the available information, the price of the
security will always trend towards its true value.
Both Congress3 5 and the Supreme Court36 have accepted that
the stock market is an efficient market. The efficiency of the stock
Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986).
s See H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 15, at 2, 22 ("[P]rices of the vast majority of
actively traded securities reflect available information about companies and the
economy."), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2294.
' See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (noting that commentators
have applauded the "fraud-on-the-market" theory because investors rely on the
valuation process performed by the market).
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market is also supported by a comprehensive array of empirical
research.3 7 In the stock market, investors rely on the integrity and
efficiency of the market's pricing mechanisms to price correctly the
securities traded so that they will be guided to invest capital
resources in the most efficient manner." Efficient pricing mecha-
nisms are classified into three different categories, the weak form,
the strong form, and the semistrong form.39
1. The Weak Form
The weak form of efficient pricing assumes that "prices fully
reflect all information contained in the historical pattern of market
prices."4" Thus, an investor cannot predict future prices by
analyzing past pricing patterns; stock price movements simply follow
a random walk4 where today's price is the market's best estimate of
what the stock will trade at tomorrow, although the two prices are
mutually independent.4 2 As a result, no advantage will be achieved
by speculation based on past prices as other investors have already
anticipated any pricing pattern and accounted for it in their trad-
ing.43 This form of the ECMH is not particularly relevant to the
3 See, e.g., EUGENE F. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE, PORTFOLIO DECISIONS AND
SECURITIES 133-68 (1976) (discussing empirical research and economic framework that
tend to support the existence of an efficient stock market); KENNETH GARBADE,
SECURITIES MARKETS 241-49 (1982) (discussing weak-form efficiency, in which
knowledge of the past pattern of securities prices does not improve an investor's
ability to forecast future stock returns).
3' See, e.g., Roger J. Dennis, Risk Arbitrageurs and the Market for Corporate Control,
37 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 417 (1985) (book review).
" Eugene Fama is credited with the first proposal and full elaboration of the
ECMH in three forms. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25J. FIN. 383 (1970); cf. RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 593 (1984)
(arguing that the trichotomy of weak, semistrong, and strong forms of market
efficiency should be viewed as "an approximation of an underlying relationship
between how broadly information is initially distributed, and the particular market
mechanism").4°JAMES D. COX, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW 181
(1980), reprinted in LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 1172
(2d ed. 1988).
4' A random walk in prices indicates no pattern; successive changes in value
are wholly independent of past prices. For example, when flipping a coin the odds
of getting heads is 50%, regardless of the pattern of heads or tails in previous flips.
42 See generally M.G. Kendall, The Analysis of Economic Time-Series, Part L Prices, 116
J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y (Series A) 11 (1953) (analyzing price trends in time-series).
4' There can be no advantage because, as soon as investors perceive a pricing
trend and predict a future price, they will be willing to pay that price, discounted to
the present value. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
the problem of insider trading because those trading on inside
information are not basing their investment decision on pricing
patterns but on material information that is not available to the
market.
2. The Strong Form
The strong form of the EGMH asserts that the market takes into
account all public and nonpublic information in determining the
price of a security." Nonpublic information is that which would
normally be available only to corporate insiders such as directors
and officers. Public information is all information generally
available to investors, including past pricing information and
information made available to the public through formal or
informal disclosures.45 If this form of the ECMH were correct,
there would be no advantage to trading on inside information as the
market already would have reflected the information in the price of
the stock. There is, however, evidence that the market is not
completely efficient with regard to inside information.46
3. The Semistrong Form
The semistrong form of the ECMH states that a security's price
reflects only publicly available information regarding the value of
that security.17 The implication is that profitable trading strategies
or arbitrage opportunities are not presented by the use of already
public information.4 8 Additionally, given that the market correctly
CORPORATE FINANCE 294 fig. 13-3 (4th ed. 1991). The price of the security will thus
fully incorporate any future prices.
44 
See JAMES H. LORIE & MARY HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE 97 (1973).4
1 See Jeffery N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 771 (1985). But note that,
"[t]he availability of information is a function of its distribution among traders in a
given market. Different 'bits' of information are more or less 'available' depending
on how many traders are aware of them." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 39, at 558.
46 See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 40, at 1175 (discussing evidence that is
inconsistent with the strong form of market efficiency);Jerome B. Baesel & Garry R.
Stein, The Value of Information: Inferences from the Profitability of Insider Trading, 14J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 553,563-69 (1979) (showing empirically that insiders
do achieve returns in excess of the market).
47 See GARBADE, supra note 37, at 249-59.
48 For an analysis of studies concluding that traders cannot obtain abnormal
returns on a security by trading on publicly released information, see THOMAS E.
COPELAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY. 198-204
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values securities, investors cannot consistently achieve greater
returns than the market unless they utilize information that is not
publicly available.
9
The semistrong form of the ECMH has been the most widely
received."0  In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,5  the Supreme Court,
although not explicitly, accepted the semistrong form. 2  The
implications of the semistrong form of the ECMH for insider
trading are clear. Those investors who possess nonpublic informa-
tion that the market has not yet factored into the price of a stock
will estimate the true value of the particular stock better than other
investors in the market. Consequently, investors with nonpublic
information will be able to earn higher returns as compared with
their less-informed counterparts. Because the market will eventually
conform its evaluation of the stock's value to the "true value" of the
stock upon public release of the once-nonpublic information, those
who made advantageous trades on the basis of that information
prior to its release will be better off.
Assuming, arguendo, that the empirical evidence supporting the
Court's reasoning in Basic is correct,"3 the perceived inefficien-
(1979).
49 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 43, at 295 (noting that in the semistrong
efficient market theory defined by Harry Roberts, all publicly available information
is accurately reflected in stock prices); see also James M. Patell & Mark A. Wolfson,
The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to Earnings and Dividend Announcements,
13 J. FIN. EcoN. 223, 223-52 (1984) (finding that information announced on the
broad tape with regard to earnings and dividends is mostly reflected in the price of
the stock within five to fifteen minutes).
" See Robert M. Daines & Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case
for Restructuring Corporate Law, 102 YALE LJ. 577, 610 (1992). Courts that have
adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory have alluded to studies establishing the
validity of the semistrong form of the ECMH. See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital
Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 910
(1989).
51 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
2 The Court stated that it did not intend to "conclusively... adopt any particular
theory of how quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected in
market price." Id. at 248 n.28. The Court went on to adopt the fraud-on-the-market
theory, however, which provides that investors may be wronged if information is not
made public when there is a duty to disclose. See id. at 241-45. The fraud-on-the-
market theory is incompatible with the strong form of the ECMH because, under the
strong form, the nondisclosure of inside information would not affect market price.
See supra part I.A.2.
" See generally Ray Ball & Philip Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting
Income Numbers, 6J. AccT. RES. 159 (1968) (testing whether net income is predicted
by security prices); Fama, supra note 39, at 383 (discussing evidence of the efficiency
of capital markets); Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New
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cies and possible benefits of permitting insider trading may be
explored.
B. Is Insider Trading Harmful Anyway?
To analyze the effectiveness of current insider trading regula-
don, and in particular the validity of the misappropriation theory,
the objectives of regulating insider trading must be defined. There
are several possible reasons for insider trading regulation, but these
reasons generally fall into two distinct categories. The first category
is promoting economic efficiency in the capital markets. 4 The
second is providing markets that are fundamentally fair to both
insiders and outsiders.5" Insofar as insider trading is simply wrong
because of its inherent unfairness,5 6 or because it detrimentally
impacts the efficient operation of securities markets, punishment of
the wrongdoers and disgorgement of their unfair profits become
important aims of the regulatory system.
1. Economic Efficiency
To determine properly the scope and shape of insider trading
regulation, an analysis of the effects of insider trading on market
efficiency must be conducted in which the perceived costs are
weighed against any benefits of such trading. 7  If a market is
efficient, the price at which shares are bought and sold will be an
Information, 10 INT'L ECON. REV. 1 (1969) (suggesting that the market successfully
anticipates high returns in the months leading up to a stock split); George Foster,
Stock Market Reaction to Estimates of Earnings Per Share By Company Officials, 1 IJ. ACCT.
RES. 25, 35 (1973) (noting an empirically observed, rapid adjustment of stock prices
to publicly stated estimates of annual earnings per share by company officials).
' See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 39, at 597-609 (discussing some of the ways
in which market efficiency is adversely affected by insider trading).
55 SeeJill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179, 220-21 (1991) (discussing the unfairness of allowing
insiders to trade on information to which outsiders are unable to gain access).
' See generally Leo Katz, Crime Consen and Insider Trading, 5J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 217 (1994) (providing an argument in support of the inherent unfairness of
insider trading, even if investors consent).
"' There is a tension between requiring immediate full disclosure of all material
information, which will improve the efficiency of the market, and protecting the
legitimate interests of shareholders by keeping certain information confidential. The
Basic Court recognized that "'silence pending settlement of the price and structure
of a deal is beneficial to most investors, most of the time.'" Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224,235 (1988) (quoting Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987)). Nevertheless, the Court refused to allow materially
false disclosures even if such statements would maximize shareholder value. See id.
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accurate reflection of the true underlying value of the stock.5 8
Investors will then be properly guided in their capital investment
decisions by the price of the security. 9 Conversely, investing
scarce resources in a security that does not accurately reflect its true
value is an inefficient use of capital as the return will not be
commensurate with the risk. 0
Inaccurate stock prices also create societal costs. "When
companies raise capital at inaccurate prices, existing shareholders
derive gains to the extent that new investors overpay for their
shares, and suffer losses to the extent that new investors under-
pay."6 1 If by issuing overpriced securities a corporation will obtain
benefits for existing shareholders that exceed the losses from a
project, the company will proceed to raise capital for an unprofit-
able project. Likewise, a corporation will refrain from issuing
securities for a profitable project if the losses from selling those
'8 See supra part I.A.
"Investors are guided by the price of the security in the investment of their
capital because they seek a return that is commensurate with the risk associated with
a given investment. The Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM') provides that a
security will give a return of
r=re+3 (rm-rf)
where r = the expected return on the investment.
= the correlation of the security's price movement with that of the
market. P reflects the risk of the investment.
r. = the return on the market.
r, = the return on a risk-free investment.
The price at which a company's stock should trade is defined as the discounted value
of the income from future dividends or
po=E DIVIDn
n=1 (i+.r)n
where DIVID = the dividend paid.
n the period at which dividends are paid.
r = the discount rate.
Therefore, if the price of a stock is not commensurate with the perceived risk for that
investment, investors will act quickly either to purchase or sell that stock until the
price is brought into line with the expected return. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note
43, at 50, 165.
" See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices,
41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1006 (1992) (noting that "[i]naccurate stock prices.., can lead to
an inefficient allocation of capital").
61 Id.
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shares at a bargain price will exceed the project's profits. When
stock prices accurately reflect the underlying value of a security,
however, new investors pay exactly what the shares are worth and
are able to evaluate their investment decisions on the merits.
Therefore, on the corporate level, as demonstrated at the individual
level, inaccurate stock prices will lead to the inefficient allocation of
capital. 2 Given the importance of market efficiency, it is surpris-
ing that the net effect of insider trading on the efficiency of the
marketplace remains unsettled. A brief overview of the debate
surrounding this controversy follows.
a. Arguments That Deregulating Insider Trading
Will Increase Market Efficiency
Some commentators claim that allowing insiders to trade on
nonpublic information actually may be beneficial.6 3 They contend
that allowing insiders to trade on nonpublic information promotes
the efficiency of capital markets by signalling the true value of a
company's stock to the market without explicitly disclosing
information that cannot feasibly be made public.6 4 This signalling
is beneficial in a situation where "an announcement would destroy
the value of the information, would be too expensive, not believ-
able, or-owing to the uncertainty of the information-would subject
the firm to massive damage liability if it turned out ex post to be
incorrect."65 The mechanism by which this "signalling" takes place
62 See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REv. 857, 866-68 (1983) (arguing that insider trading can be an effective
method of communicating information which in turn leads to accurate share prices
which guide efficient capital investment).
6
3 See generally HENRYQ'. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET at vii
(1966) (positing that the rewards of insider trading may flow to those who are
responsible for producing the news as a desirable form of compensation); Carlton &
Fischel, supra note 62, at 869-72 (proposing that insider tradingby managers reduces
agency costs, obviates renegotiation of salaries, and provides valuable information
about prospective managers); Ronald A. Dye, Insider Trading and Incentives, 57J. Bus.
295, 297 (1984) (demonstrating that "the desirability of inside trading depends on the
distributional relationship among the inside information held by management, the
manager's effort, and the output of the firm that employs him" and that under
certain assumptions, the firm's managers and owners may benefit by permitting the
manager to trade on inside information).
6 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 62, at 857-58, 866, 868.
65 Id. at 868. For example, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the
defendant corporation issued three false public statements alleging that it was not
engaging in merger negotiations. See id. at 227. The purpose for doing so was to
avoid pricing itself out of the market for a Combustion Engineering tender offer. See
1091
1092 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1077
can be illustrated by example."6 Suppose an insider knows of
favorable corporate information that has not yet been released to
the public. This insider would be willing to purchase shares at the
high end of the market, knowing that they are actually worth more
than the purchase price. Such an action would contribute to an up-
trend of the stock price, even under a weak form of the EGMH,
because the purchase price would be public information that
investors would discount into the price they are willing to pay for
the security.6 7 Therefore, when the news was actually released to
the public, some of that information would already be reflected in
the price of the stock.
This argument is hampered, however, by empirical evidence that
indicates that trading by insiders on nonpublic information does not
have a significant impact on market prices.6 8 The reason for this
phenomenon is that the price of any security is simply a reflection
of risks and returns for which the market offers many substitutes.69
id. at 227-28. In general, a tender offer occurs when an acquiring company offers to
buy a certain percentage of the outstanding shares of its target at a premium to the
market. The SEC has established eight factors that characterize a tender offer. These
include:
(1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders; (2) solicitation
made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase
made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer
are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed
number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to be
purchased; (6) offer open only for a limited period of time; (7) offeree
subjected to pressure to sell his or her stock; and (8) public announcement
of a purchasing program precedes or accompanies rapid accumulation of
the target's securities.
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 515. For further discussion of the definition of
a tender offer and the unique scheme of regulation of tender offers established under
the federal securities laws, see William C. Tyson & Andrew A. August, The Williams
Act After RICO: Has the Balance Tipped in Favor of Incumbent Management?, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1983). Early notice to the market that a tender offer was being
considered would have increased the price of Basic's stock such that Combustion
Engineering could no longer finance the deal. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 227-28 n.4
(following rumors of merger negotiators that Basic stock was trading at new highs).
Notice to the public would have destroyed the value of the information if it had
meant that the merger could no longer be consummated.
66See MANNE, supra note 63, at 161 (noting that if "full disclosure were made of
a corporation's intention to buy a certain number of shares, the stock price would
immediately jump almost to the level indicated by the value of this news").
67 See supra part I.A.1.
See Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and
the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1446 (1967).
6' For a discussion of this mechanism as stated by the Capital Asset Pricing Model,
see supra note 59.
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The supply, or float, is all securities offering similar risks and
returns between which investors would be indifferent.7" Accord-
ingly, unless the volume of the insider's trade is extremely large, the
change in the float caused by the trade "is simply too small to have
any but a transitory, and probably insignificant, impact on the price
of the security."7 1 The insider's trade would change the market's
evaluation of the security's risk and return, and hence its price, only
if the market believed that the insider had private information not
previously factored into the price of the security. 2 This pricing
mechanism would be effective, however, only if the market was
aware of the insider's identity. 3 Yet, the market usually will learn
the identity of the trader only after the inside information has been
disclosed to the public; namely, when the SEC publishes the insider
trading reports under section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, well after
the ten to forty days in which the trade is required to be disclosed
to the Commission.
74
A second argument in favor of deregulating insider trading is
that such trading is a more adequate means of compensating
entrepreneurs within the company than traditional forms of
compensation. 71 Professor Manne was one of the first to argue
that only insider trading "readily allows corporate entrepreneurs to
market their innovations"7 6 because the wage market cannot ade-
quately and accurately compensate an entrepreneur whose function
"is to make new combinations of productive factors." 77 A compen-
sation structure that permits insider trading will encourage insiders
to create favorable conditions for the corporation knowing that an
increase in share value will translate into a direct personal profit.
78
The insider will be able to purchase stock in anticipation of the
improved financial condition, wait until the market revalues the
stock, and sell at a profit. Of course, outside investors will also
benefit from the price increase.
79
70See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 39, at 630.
71 Id.
7 See id. at 629-34.
7' See id. at 630.
74 See 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1994); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 39, at 632.
71 Manne claims that a "rule allowing insiders to trade freely may be fundamental
to the survival of our corporate system." MANNE, supra note 63, at 110.
76 Id. at 138.
7 Id. at 116.
7 See MichaelJ. Chmiel, Note, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988: Codifying a Private Right of Action, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 645, 648.
71 "Compensating managers in this fashion increases the size of the pie, and thus
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Critics, 'however, point out that most inside traders are lower-
level functionaries who have no real impact on the firm's profits,
whether or not they have additional motivation.80 Therefore, this
special insider trading compensation can be inefficient due to being
overinclusive. An additional concern is that such a compensation
scheme would encourage executives to focus on increasing their
own prosperity without regard for their fiduciary duties to the
shareholders.8 1  Furthermore, several compensation schemes
already exist that make remuneration contingent upon entrepre-
neurial contributions. These include stock options, stock apprecia-
tion rights, and bonuses based upon the company's profits.
2
Referring to these more efficient types of compensation schemes,
the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.83 repudiated
the argument that deregulation of insider trading would provide a
legitimate form of corporate compensation. The court found that
"the normal motivation induced by stock ownership, i.e., the
identification of an individual with corporate progress, is ill-
promoted by condoning the sort of speculative insider activity which
occur[s]" when insiders freely trade on material nonpublic informa-
tion.84
A third argument in favor of deregulation attacks the wisdom of
a broad prohibition against insider trading on the basis of economic
analysis. The argument is that "the harm caused by insider trading
can be objectively measured and that so measured it does not cause
any detectable injury to investors." 85 As the "odds against any
long-term investor's being hurt by an insider trading on undisclosed
outsiders as well as insiders profit from the incentives managers are given to increase
the value of the firm." Carlton & Fischel, supra note 62, at 881. A corollary is that
risk averse executives will have an incentive to take more risks, providing investors
with a higher return, see supra note 59, if they are able to sell short on the basis of
inside information and cover any losses to which they would otherwise be personally
exposed.
80 See, e.g., ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 279 (1986).
8" See Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 46-49 (1986) (arguing that insider trading is an
inefficient form of compensation because the benefit to the insider is based not on
the value of his contribution but on the amount of his investment).
82 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); cf. Bainbridge, supra note 81, at 46-49 (arguing that
these compensation schemes are not adequate for corporate compensation).
a8 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
'4 Id. at 851.
' Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1,
55 (1980).
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information is almost infinitesimally small,""6 why should Congress,
through the SEC, expend a vast amount of resources and energy
policing a prohibition on insider trading? The answer lies in what
are perceived to be the harms caused by insider trading.
b. Arguments That Regulating Insider Trading
Will Increase Market Efficiency
Several arguments have been advanced that provide a basis for
the regulation of trading on material nonpublic information. First,
permitting insiders to trade on the basis of inside information will
discourage legitimate research and analysis because of the presence
in the market of insiders who possess an overwhelming informa-
tional advantage as a consequence of their positions in the corpora-
87tion.
Second, insiders who are able to trade freely on nonpublic
information will have an incentive to focus their efforts on the
advancement of their own welfare. In directing their efforts to
improving their own position, they will spend less time advancing
shareholder wealth. Where their objectives and those of the
corporation diverge, the efficient operation of the firm is sacri-
ficed. 8
Third, allowing trades that are based on inside information
provides bad incentives. An insider who is able to profit on both
bad and good information has an incentive to damage the corpora-
tion, a task that is arguably easier than increasing the market value
of the company. 9 Such harm is a breach of the fiduciary duty
"s MANNE, supra note 63, at 110.
"' See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 39, at 622. This effect may be a result of
the "Efficiency Paradox." The paradox states that as a market becomes perfectly
efficient with respect to certain information, one cannot earn an abnormal return on
the acquisition of that information. As no one will earn a superior return on
information obtained through research and analysis, the market will become
inefficient again. If, however, insiders are permitted to trade on material nonpublic
information, the market will be perfectly efficient with respect to that information
and there will never be an incentive for research and analysis. Thus, trades by
insiders maintain the perfect efficiency of the market. See id. at 622-23. This
phenomenon can also be understood by recalling that when insiders are permitted
to trade on nonpublic information, the market will tend toward strong-form
efficiency. See supra part I.A.2. A market that is efficient in the strong form
discounts all public and nonpublic information into the price of the security, making
superior returns unattainable. See supra part I.A.2.
" See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
19 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 762.
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owed to the stockholders of the company" and directly diminishes
shareholder wealth.
Fourth, the corporate insider who is permitted to trade on the
basis of material nonpublic information will have an incentive to
delay the release of positive information until he has had ample
time to acquire all the shares Of the corporation's stock that he can
afford.9 ' As discussed above,92 this delay of information will
decrease the efficiency of the market, causing investors to invest
their scarce capital resources poorly. When information is widely
and quickly disseminated to the market, investors' allocation of
resources will ideally achieve "Pareto optimality." g Under Pareto
optimality, no other allocation of resources would result in any one
person's being better off without causing harm to another.
94
When information is kept from the market, however, a semistrong
form of the ECMH dictates that a lower level of optimality is
necessarily achieved.95
The corporate insider who is able to trade on material nonpublic
information may try to manipulate the market through the timing
of press releases in another way: by waiting to make a release when
its effect will be to increase market volatility.9 6 The more volatile
the market, the more the insider will have to gain, whether he is
trading on good or bad news.97 This again will lead to an ineffi-
cient market because the proper allocation of resources depends
upon prices that reflect the underlying value of the security.
98
'o See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
One acts in a "fiduciary capacity" when "the business which he transacts, or
the money or property which he handles, is not his own or for his own
benefit, but for the benefit of another person, as to whom he stands in a
relation implying and necessitating great confidence and trust on the one
part and a high degree of good faith on the other part."
Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979)).
"' See WilliamJ. Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U.
L. REV. 863, 886 (1987).
' See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
93 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 762.
SeeJoel Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic
Information, 73 GEO. LJ. 1083, 1119 (1985).
" See supra part I.A.3.
96 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 762.
17 See supra note 59.
' See Kahan, supra note 60, at 1005-08.
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2. Fundamental Unfairness
In addition to the potentially detrimental effects on market
efficiency, allowing investors to trade when they are in possession
of inside information is fundamentally unfair to those who are
without the benefit of the information and cannot legally obtain it.
The SEC used this rationale in the seminal case In re Cady, Roberts
& Co.99 to establish liability for trading on undisclosed inside
information. The SEC proclaimed that one purpose of the
securities laws is to eliminate the "use of inside information for
personal advantage." °0 "[T]he obligation [to disclose] rests on...
the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
is dealing." 0 1 This concern for the fundamental unfairness of
trading on inside information appears to be innate; somewhat like
the standard reaction to a person who plays poker with a marked
deck.
The inequity is that deregulation would give the insider a "lawful
monopoly on access to the information involved . .. which cannot
be competed away.""0 2 Still, few would argue that it is improper for
an investor who has gained superior information as a result of
diligent analysis and assiduous investigation to trade on the basis of
that information."0 3 Market analysts, for example, expend tremen-
dous resources to obtain information far superior to that possessed
by the average small investor.' °4 Should analysts be precluded
9 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
otId. at 912 n.15.
101 Id. at 912.
" Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 346 (1979).
103 By contrast, Joel Seligman argues that Congress, through legislation, should
adopt a "parity-of-information" theory to ensure that small investors are not
systematically taken advantage of by those in possession of superior information. See
Seligman, supra note 94, at 1137-40. The parity-of-information theory requires that
all investors trade on the basis of equal information. Accordingly, the theory would
"preclude anyone who possessed material nonpublic information from trading before
the information was effectively disseminated to the public" without regard for
whether the possessor of the information obtained it through analysis and research
or from inside sources. Id. at 1087. For now the Supreme Court, however, has
rejected any such parity-of-information theory. See Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (stating that "neither the Congress nor the Commission ever has
adopted a parity-of-information rule"). Furthermore, the Court has expressly
recognized the important function that market analysts perform in making securities
markets more efficient. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
o See Brudney, supra note 102, at 360 (noting that there is a "systematic
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from trading because of their informational advantage? An
argument in favor of preclusion is that the loss experienced by the
average investor does not depend on whether a party with better
information attained it through his position as a corporate insider
or because he had greater resources. But casting the net of
securities regulation so broadly as to interdict trading on mere
informational imbalances would tend to create inefficient mar-
kets." 5 Instead, the law should provide clear guidance as to which
informational disparities will be tolerated, or even encouraged, and
which will produce liability.
Beyond a general feeling of inherent unfairness, however,
permitting the overreaching of outside traders by those in posses-
sion of material nonpublic information translates into concrete
harm to corporations and investors. This harm manifests itself in
two major ways. First, the integrity of the securities markets
depends heavily on investors' confidence that the market is not
"rigged" against them.' If investors believe that others in the
market consistently have access to superior information concerning
the true value of securities, they may be reluctant to participate in
the market. °7 This boycott on the market would lead to fewer
inequality of lawful access to information by reason of disparities among individual
investors with respect to power, wealth, diligence, or intelligence").
105 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 ("Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely
because a person knowingly receives material, nonpublic information from an insider
and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts,
which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.").
10 When enacting the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, Congress noted that "the Committee views these steps as an essential ingredient
in a program to restore the confidence of the public in the fairness and integrity of
our securities markets. ... Small [investors] will be . .. reluctant to invest in the
market if [they] feel[] it is rigged against [them]." H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7-8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044-45.
107 The reluctance of investors to participate will increase the cost of capital. See
Brudney, supra note 102, at 335 ("A concomitant benefit from the expected
restoration of investor faith in the market would be a reduction in the cost of capital
by reason of eliminating the higher risk premiums required by investors to
compensate for their fear of overreaching."). Gilson and Kraakman illustrate this
point with an example of a general contractor who bids on a construction project.
The general contractor's bid is based on information provided by a subcontractor as
to when the job will be completed. If the general contractor estimates that there is
a 50% chance that the subcontractor will not complete the work on time, and the
resulting delay will cost $100,000, the general contractor must increase his bid by
$50,000 to reflect the perceived inaccuracy in the subcontractor's bid. See Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 39, at 595-96. Likewise, if an investor believes there is a chance
the person with whom he is dealing can better value the security due to superior (or
inside) information, the investor must increase the price at which he will sell the
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investors in the market. As a result, firms would have to offer
higher returns to entice the same amount of capital investment."'
Ultimately firms would incur a direct cost that is unrelated to the
actual risk of the market.
Advocates of deregulation point out, however, that despite an
increase in insider trading prosecutions and an attendant increase
in publicity surrounding insider trading, there has been no
significant decrease in the number of investors participating in the
securities markets.0 9 Even if investors perceive the stock market as
somewhat unfair, they have not chosen to stop investing, perhaps
because there is no place else that they can receive better protec-
tion.1 0 But the fact that investors have limited investment alterna-
tives is not a reason for the law to abandon them by retiring all
attempts to provide equitable securities markets.
Second, even if investors are not presented with other options,
they will face higher transaction costs in a market that permits
trading on nonpublic information.1 Markets operate through
specialists, or market makers, who ensure the smooth functioning
of the market when buy orders and sell orders are not evenly
matched. 2  The market maker maintains an inventory of a
limited number of stocks and is exposed to the risk that the value
of his inventory can depreciate before it can be sold."' The
specialist's profits are determined by the volume of shares traded
multiplied by the spread1 4 of his trades. Like other investors, if
security by the product of that chance and the value of the information. This
argument assumes that the investor is risk neutral; if the investor is risk averse, he will
also demand a risk premium, further inflating the price of the security. See id. at 596
n.137.
10' See Brudney, supra note 102, at 335.
109 See Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO
ST. LJ. 353, 354 (1988).
110 See id. This lack of choice is demonstrated by the laws in Japan, which until
recently allowed, and even encouraged, the use of inside information. See Tomoko
Akashi, Note, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1296, 1296
(1989).
.. See Iman Anabtawi, Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 377, 396-99 (1989).
12 See id. at 396.
"' See id. at 396-97 & n.75. Anabtawi identifies three risks faced by the specialist.
First, there is the capital cost of merely maintaining an inventory of cash and
securities. Second, there is the risk that the specialist's inventory will depreciate due
to lack of demand. Finally, the specialist risks trading against those who have
superior information. This final risk increases as more people enter the market with
material nonpublic information. See id. at 397.
"' The spread is the difference between the bid price (price at which the specialist
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the specialist believes that investors in the market have superior
information, he will demand a greater return to compensate for the
risk that the person he is trading against is better able to value the
securities. 5 The only way for the specialist to obtain this greater
return is to increase the spread.1 1 6 As a result, fewer traders will
be willing to purchase the securities, and the liquidity of the market
will decrease.'1 7 The increase in spreads also means that when a
firm issues stock, it will obtain a lower bid price from the market
maker.' To obtain the same capital infusion that it would have
had, had the spread been unaffected, the firm will issue more
shares."1  Thus, the cost of capital is again increased.
120
Given the perceived inefficiencies and unfairness of failing to
regulate those who trade on the basis of material nonpublic
information and the inefficiencies created through overregulation
what goals should the federal securities law aspire to achieve?
3. Goals of Insider Trading Regulation
Some of the arguments for and against the deregulation of
insider trading weigh the inefficiencies of pursuing an overbroad
policy of prohibition against those market inefficiencies created by
not regulating at all. 12 1  Others suggest that insider trading is
simply unfair to outsiders in the market.122  Although it is not
entirely clear whether insider trading is harmful, 123 it seems clear,
buys from traders) and the ask price (price at which the specialist sells to traders).
See Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of Common
Stocks' Efficiency, 19J. CORP. L. 285, 300 (1994).
11 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
118 See William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal
Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1239 (1981) (stating that "after selling to an inside trader, a
specialist... might increase price quotations; after buying from an inside trader, a
specialist ... might decrease his prices").
117 As the spread increases, an investor must have a greater expectation of the
security's future price before purchasing, because he must cover the spread before
he makes a profit. See Anabtawi, supra note 111, at 397.
18 See id.
19 See id. (suggesting that instead of issuing more shares, a corporation may
choose to increase its level of debt financing and derive a smaller proportion of funds
from equity).
120 See id.
121 See supra part I.B.1.
122 See supra part I.B.2.
123 See Anabtawi, supra note 111, at 395 ("A serious difficulty with this price
efficiency rationale for insider trading is that illegal insider trading has not been
shown empirically to have any significant effect on share prices."); Carlton & Fischel,
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under today's securities laws, that the regulation of insider trading
in the securities markets will be vigorously pursued by the SEC and
the Justice Department for some time to come.'2 4 Most of the
jurisprudence generated by Rule 10b-5 presumes that insider
trading has detrimental effects on the market and on investors.'
25
Given this presumption, the law governing insider trading must seek
to limit the inefficiencies created by market regulation and protect
investors from unfair informational imbalances. In doing so,
however, these laws must also provide bright-line, understandable
rules. They should establish "'minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement." 12  Otherwise a "statute may permit 'a standardless
sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue
their personal predilections.'"M12 But the courts have not always
adhered to these goals in developing today's securities laws,
especially in formulating the misappropriation theory. Judge
Winter of the Second Circuit stated: o
The legal rules governing insider trading under Section 10(b) are
based solely on administrative and judicial caselaw. This caselaw
establishes that some trading on material nonpublic information
is illegal and some is not. The line between the two is less than
clear. Although Congress has enhanced the penalties for illegal
insider trading [in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984], it
has not defined the criteria by which legal insider trading is
separated from illegal trading.
128
supra note 62, at 859 (questioning why, if insider trading is harmful, empirical
evidence demonstrates that insider trading is widespread, highly profitable, and has
met little resistance from firms).
121 See Fisch, supra note 55, at 228.
125 Courts point to the unfairness to shareholders, the harm to the corporation
due to a loss of confidence in the securities markets, and the fact that insider trading
may hinder market efficiency as reasons for upholding regulation. See Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 765-67 (1974) (Blackmun,J., dissenting)
("'Manipulators who have in the past had a comparatively free hand to befuddle and
fool the public ... are to be curbed. . . ." (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 2271 (1934)));
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) ("The
core of Rule 10b-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all
investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities
transactions."), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
12' Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
127 Id. (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575).
121 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,572 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Winter,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
1004 (1992).
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The following Part discusses how the legal analysis of the
Commission and the courts has left a hole in the regulation of
insider trading; a hole that many courts have attempted to fill with
a square peg-the misappropriation theory.
II. CONGRESS, THE COMMISSION, AND THE COURTS:
GRAPPLING WITH INSIDER TRADING
A. Overview of Insider Trading
Given the press-generated publicity over the Boesky's, Levine's,
and Reich's of the securities world'29 and the propagation of
public interest in the topic as evidenced in the late 1980s by movies
such as Wall Street,' it is surprising that the federal securities
laws do not expressly prohibit insider trading. Only sections 16,
20A, aud 21A of the Exchange Act directly address the trading of
securities by insiders.
Section 16(b) requires statutory insiders' 3' to disgorge any
profits earned through short-term trading."2 Section 16(c) wholly
prohibits statutory insiders from engaging in certain types of
trades.1 3 Liability under section 16, however, is not premised on
the misuse of inside information. Instead, "[fjor the purpose of
preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained ... by reason of [a] relationship to the issuer," the section
imposes strict liability on the basis of short-term trading only.
3 4
Thus, an insider whose trades are separated by more than the
statutory six-month period does not violate section 16 even if that
trade was based on inside information.
3 5
Section 20AI36 provides a private cause of action for those who
12 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
's WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987). The movie depicts a stockbroker,
Bud Fox, who becomes embroiled in an insider trading scandal after meeting Gordon
Gekko, a high-powered, extremely successful, but ruthless broker whose philosophy
is that "[g]reed, for want of a better word, is good. Greed is right. Greed works."
The movie eventually demonstrates that Gekko's greed results in tangible harm to
those companies and investors that he manipulates.
1 Section 16(b) defines insiders as directors, officers, and 10% shareholders of
the corporation. See Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p(a) (1994).
..2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
's' See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
1 See id.
" Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 20A, 15
U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994).
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trade in the market contemporaneously with an inside trader.
Although the section addresses insider trading, it dbes not make
insider trading illegal. It merely permits private actions against
those who violate other statutory, regulatory, or court-defined
restrictions.
1 3
7
Section 21A provides the SEC with the authority to bring an
action for civil penalties against anyone who engages in insider
trading.' Like section 20A, section 21A does not make insider
trading illegal nor does it explicitly define insider trading. Instead,
section 21A merely addresses the SEC's ability to impose civil
penalties on inside traders.
1 9
Under what theory then is insider trading illegal? The courts
and the Commission have concluded that insider trading is
encompassed within the language of the general antifraud provi-
sion,140 section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5,
which prohibits fraud and deception in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities., The Supreme Court views the
s7 Section 20A states: "Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or
the rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of material, nonpublic information shall be liable .... Id.
" See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 21A, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(1)(A) (1994) ("Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any
person has violated any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material,
nonpublic information ... the Commission may bring an action.., to impose, a civil
penalty .... ").
13 See id.
"4' See supra notes 23, 25.
... See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,911 (1961). In holding that trading on
the basis of inside information is a violation of the securities laws, the Commission
stated:
[O]ne of the major purposes of the securities acts is the prevention of fraud,
manipulation or deception in connection with securities transactions.
Consistent with this objective, . . . Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5,. . .are broad remedial provisions aimed at reaching misleading
or deceptive activities.
Id. at 910; see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc) (setting forth a broad definition of acts and persons covered by Rule IOb-5
in the context of a rich ore strike), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Ross v. Licht, 263
F. Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (applying a broad definition of insiders to a plan
by buyers to resell shares of stock at a much higher price); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798,800 (E.D. Pa.) (using a liberal construction of Rule 10b-
5 in finding a private right of action in the context of a contract to sell a company's
assets with as yet unrecognized value), supplemented by 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa.
1947); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457,457-58 (D. Del. 1947) (finding
that an officer violated § 10(b) by buying the plaintiff's stock with foreknowledge that
the company's inventory would increase in value).
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legal effect of the insider's silence with regard to the information to
be a fraudulent omission under certain circumstances even though
section 10(b) "does not state whether silence may constitute a
manipulative or deceptive device." 142 Based on notions of common
law fraud, however, the Court has limited the application of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to those instances in which the insider has a
duty to speak.143 As at common law, the Court reasoned that a
misrepresentation had to consist of an affirmative misstatement, and
only in limited circumstances could an omission be used as grounds
for liability. 44 When no duty compels disclosure by the person
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, no securities
fraud and, therefore, no violation of Rule lOb-5 has occurred.'4 5
142 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
143 See id. at 228 ("But one who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when there is a duty to do so.").
144 See id. at 227-28. The Second Restatement of Torts states the common law rule
as follows:
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably
induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is
subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the
nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, i but only if, he is
under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter
in question.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
... Traditionally, the plaintiff in a common law deceit action has the burden of
proving that he justifiably relied to his detriment on a misrepresentation of a material
fact that the defendant made with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity with
the intent that the plaintiff rely. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW
OF TORTS § 32:18 n.8 7 (1992). In defining the elements of fraud, courts have varied
widely as to the number of, and description of, the elements that comprise the deceit
action. When comparing each court's description in total, however, there is an
overall similarity. See id. § 32:18. One court defined the elements as follows:
(1) There must be a representation;
(2) That representation must be false;
(3) It must have to do with a past or present fact;
(4) That fact must be material;
(5) It must be susceptible of knowledge;
(6) The representor must know it to be false, or in the alternative, must
assert it as of his own knowledge without knowledge;
(7) The representor must intend to have the other person induced to act,
or justified in acting upon it;
(8) That person must be so induced to act or so justified in acting,
(9) The person's action must be in reliance upon the representation;
(10) That person must suffer damage;
(11) That damage must be attributable to the misrepresentation, that is, the
statement must be the proximate cause of the injury.
Id. § 32:18 n.88 (citing Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826, 829-30 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985)). At common law, a duty to disclose has been recognized under the following
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
The requirement of a duty has provoked considerable judicial
searching for a breach of duty in cases where there intuitively
should be a remedy, but where common law notions of fraud fall
short. Thus far, the courts have developed two distinct bases of
liability for securities laws violations: traditional theory and the
misappropriation theory. Traditional theory applies to the classic
insider trading case of a corporate officer who uses information
received in a corporate capacity to trade for his own account.14 6
The misappropriation theory is used inadequately to fill the
judicially created hole resulting from the narrow construction of
current traditional theory.
147
B. Insiders, Outsiders, and Fiduciary Duties:
The Development of Traditional Theory
Traditional theory bases a violation of section 10(b) by a
corporate insider on the premise that the insider breaches his state
law fiduciary148 obligation to the corporation and its shareholders
when he trades on the basis of material nonpublic information.
49
The classic example is the director who learns that his corporation
circumstances: (1) all material facts must be disclosed when there is a fiduciary or
similar relationship of trust and confidence between the parties; (2) superior material
information concerning a transaction must be disclosed when the other party cannot
reasonably discover the information and is under a mistaken belief with regard to it;
(3) all material facts that have been concealed by an affirmative effort must be
disclosed; (4) statements made in good faith that are later discovered to be false must
be corrected; (5) all material facts must be disclosed if anything is said; and (6) all
material facts must be disclosed as required by statute. See id. § 32:68.
'
4 6 See infra part II.B.
See infra part II.C.
A fiduciary relationship is one that
involves discretionary authority and dependency: One person depends on
another-the fiduciary-to serve his interests. In relying on a fiduciary to act
for his benefit, the beneficiary of the relation may entrust the fiduciary with
custody over property of one sort or another. Because the fiduciary obtains
access to this property to serve the ends of the fiduciary relationship, he
becomes duty bound not to appropriate the property for his own use.
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
..9 The theory is that directors, officers, and controlling shareholders are
effectively trustees of the corporation and thereby owe fiduciary duties to it. See, e.g.,
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) ("Joint adventurers.., owe to
one another ... the duty of finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm's length[] are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place.").
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will have better than predicted earnings for the quarter. In
response, he purchases shares of his company's stock at the current
market price, knowing that once the revised earnings are announced
the price of his company's shares is likely to increase. Traditional
theory finds that the director has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders who sold him their shares by purchasing the stock at
a price lower than the shareholders would have demanded had they
known of the revised earnings.
Although a more tenuous proposition, another example that
implicates traditional theory involves a director who learns of bad
news that will affect the company he serves. In response to this
news, the director sells stock that he owns on the open market to
investors who would not have paid the high market price if they had
been aware of the information that the director possessed. 150 The
director thus avoids a loss at the expense of other shareholders
when the information is ultimately made public.
The current philosophy that defines the application of tradi-
tional insider trading theory in particular situations results from
many years ofjudicial explication of Rule 1Ob-5. To understand this
philosophy, the history of Rule 10b-5 and the development of
traditional theory must be examined.
" This proposition is more tenuous because the director does not stand in a
fiduciary relationship with the purchasers until after the sale is completed and the
investors become owners of the company's stock. Therefore, a strict application of
the traditional theory would find that no fiduciary relationship existed at the time of
the trade and, accordingly, there was no duty to reveal the information. The courts
have rejected this strict approach, however, and found a violation in such circum-
stances. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 573-74 (Winters, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that an insider's duty is not limited to existing
stockholders); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914 (N.Y. 1969) (holding
directors liable for selling stock in their company in anticipation of bad news); Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (holding that insiders must disclose material
information to persons with whom they deal). Judge Winters explained:
We cannot accept respondents' contention that an insider's responsibility
is limited to existing stockholders and that he has no special duties when
sales of securities are made to non-stockholders. This approach is too
narrow. It ignores the plight of the buying public-wholly unprotected from
the misuse of special information.... Whatever distinctions may have
existed at common law based on the view that an officer or director may
stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders from whom he
purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly
not appropriate to introduce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts
embodied in the securities acts.
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 573-74.
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
1. The Dubious History of Rule 10b-5
As noted, Rule 10b-5 is the primary general antifraud provision
used to regulate insider trading. 5 ' Yet the rule had modest begin-
nings. The SEC adopted it after only cursory review and discussion
to respond quickly to a situation not then addressed by the
securities laws. The president of a company had made negative
false statements regarding the financial viability of his company in
order to lower the share price of the company's stock. 52 Knowing
that the share price would significantly increase when the company's
earnings report reflecting the corporation's true value was pub-
lished, he purchased shares on the open market at a bargain
price.'53 In responding to this specific situation, the commissioners
never anticipated that the rule would become the "catch-all"
provision for fraud. They were not focused on insiders who
remained silent about a company's position when trading while in
the possession of material nonpublic information, and they certainly
did not foresee the private right of action that the courts have since
implied.'54 Their response to the problem at hand was a broadly
worded rule that has remained unchanged since its promulgation.
In enacting section 10(b), Congress intended to guard against
fraudulent market manipulation such as that which led to the stock
market crash of 1929.155 The development and scope of Rule
10b-5, however, was unplanned. "[I]t is difficult to think of another
"I See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
152 See American Bar Ass'n Section of Corp., Banking & Business Law, Conference
on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws; 22 Bus. LAW. 793,922-23 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter Securities Laws Conference] (comments of Milton V. Freeman).
153 See id.
" See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa.) (holding
that, while the statute and the Rule "do[] not even provide in express terms for a
remedy.., the existence of a remedy is implicit under the general principles of the
law"), supplemented by 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Freeman described the
development of the rule as follows:
I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them
together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in connection
with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the end
.... We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicating
approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he
said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it happened.
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 778-79; Securities Laws Conference, supra note 152,
at 922.
155 See WILLIAM H. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 1-6 (1968).
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instance in the entire corpus juris in which the interaction of the
legislative, administrative rulemaking, and judicial processes has
produced so much from so little." 5 '
The legislative history of section 10(b) is scant, and for that
reason the courts have found that a determination whether
Congress contemplated a provision as broad as Rule 10b-5 is
difficult to make. 5 7 At least one commentator has noted, however,
that if "Congress wanted to promulgate a prohibition of such
generality, it could have done so and eliminate the intermediate
requirement of a Commission regulation. The rule as promulgated
drew upon no specific expertise of the SEC."15 Consequently,
section 10(b)'s generality has meant that its substance comes from
the ad hoc adjudication of the courts and the SEC.
2. Early Interpretation and the Supreme Court's
Limitation of Rule 10b-5
The checkered history of Rule 10b-5 is most logically divided
into two periods. Until 1975, the Rule's scope continually expanded
as it was applied to new types of transactions, and any proposed
limiting doctrines were usually rejected by the courts.' Begin-
ning in 1975, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the scope
of the rule, confining its application to narrower areas and
providing a fertile ground for litigation over the boundaries of those
areas. 160
One of the first steps toward expansion was ajudicial determina-
tion that, although the express language of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 did not create a private right of action, defrauded persons
could obtain a private remedy using these regulations to rescind a
securities transaction. 6 1 In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., the
plaintiffs, Morris and Eugene Kardon, and the defendants, Leon and
William Slavin, each owned one fourth of the stock of two paper
companies, Western Board and Paper Co. and Michigan Paper Stock
Co. 6 ' All of the parties were officers of the companies and
1' LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 777.
'157 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
1' Kitch, supra note 28, at 861.
159 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 780.
160 See id.
161 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp 798, 800 (E.D. Pa.),
supplemented by 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
162 See id.
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together constituted the entire Board of Directors of each of the
two companies. 163 Unbeknownst to the Kardons, Leon Slavin had
negotiated an agreement to sell Western Board and Paper to
National Gypsum for $1,500,000.161 Prior to consummating the
sale, the Slavins purchased the Kardons' stock in this company for
a discounted $504,000 with the knowledge that the price of the
stock would go up as soon as the sale was announced.6 5' At the
meeting at which the sale of the stock was consummated, Leon
Slavin affirmatively represented that he had not made any agree-
ment for the sale of either of the companies.1 6 The Kardons did
not learn until later of the negotiations with National Gypsum and
certainly would not have sold their stock at such a low price had
they known about the arrangement. 67 The district court held that,
although the Exchange Act "does not ... provide in express terms
for a remedy, ... the existence of a remedy is implicit under
general principles of the law."
161
Kardon is significant because the provision for a private right of
action in a case of insider trading creates a federal forum for
garden-variety common law fraud, provided that the fraud takes
place in the securities markets.169 Common law fraud is typically
an area of little national or federal interest and is traditionally
within the purview of state, not federal, courts.17 Even the doc-
trines later adopted by the Supreme Court limiting the application
of Rule 10b-51 "I do not affect the availability of the private-right-
of-action rule for Kardon-type cases.172
163 See id.
Ir" See id. at 800-01.
165 See id. at 801.
166 See id.
I'l See id. at 800.
16
8 Id. at 802.
1
69 SeeJoseph A. Grundfest, Desimplifying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 990 n.132 (1994);
supra note 145 (discussing the elements of common law fraud). Plaintiffs view a
federal forum as preferable to state court for many reasons, some of which include
nationwide service of process under § 27 of the Exchange Act, see 15 U.S.C. 78aa
(1994), the more liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and a belief that federal judges are more sympathetic to plaintiffs than are state
judges. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 917
(5th ed. 1994). "Further, the state security-for-expenses statutes for derivative suits
[are] inapplicable to rule 10b-5 suits, and hence a plaintiff [can] avoid posting an
expensive bond simply by framing his complaint under that rule." Id.
170 See HAMILTON, supra note 169, at 917.
171 See infra notes 215-29 and accompanying text.
17 See Grundfest, supra note 169, at 189-91.
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The SEC first expanded the scope of Rule 1Ob-5 to reach beyond
the confines of the traditional definition of "corporate insider"
173
in its seminal opinion, In re Cady, Roberts & Co.'74 On November
25, 1959, the Board of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation met to set
the fourth-quarter dividend for the year. 75 During the first three
quarters the Board had declared a $0.625 dividend, but decided that
the fourth-quarter dividend should be reduced to $0.375.176 At
approximately 11:00 a.m., the Board approved disclosure of the
dividend to the New York Stock Exchange, but there was a delay in
transmitting the information due to a typing problem. 177  The
announcement did not appear on the Dow Jones ticker tape until
11:48 a.m. and was not delivered to the Exchange until 12:29
p.m.17  During a recess of the Board meeting, and prior to Dow
Jones's receipt of the information, J. Cheever Cowdin, a Curtiss-
Wright director, notified Robert Gintel, a broker at Cady, Roberts
& Co., that the Board had cut the dividend. 179 Prior to the dis-
semination of the news to the public, Gintel sold 7000 shares of
Curtiss-Wright Stock.8 0  In his opinion, SEC Chairman Cary
declared that the conduct engaged in by Cowdin and Gintel was just
the type of fraudulent and manipulative conduct that Congress
sought to proscribe in enacting section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933181 and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to protect
investors. 182  Robert Gintel's conduct was prohibited, however,
even though he was not a traditional insider of the corporation.
The Commission stated:
We have already noted that anti-fraud provisions are phrased in
terms of "any person" and that a special obligation has been
traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, directors
and controlling stockholders. These three groups, however, do
173 Traditional corporate insiders are directors, officers, employees who obtain
information in the course of their employment, and majority shareholders who have
a fiduciary duty to a corporation by nature of their large stockholdings. See
FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 213-21, 227-29.
174 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
175 See id. at 909.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 15 U.S.C. § 7 7q(a) (1994).
182 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911.
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not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an
obligation.'
Instead, the Commission ruled that an individual's duty to disclose
material nonpublic information prior to trading on the basis of that
information, otherwise known as a rule of "disclose or abstain," is
based on two principal elements: (1) a relationship between the
trader and the inside source of the information such that the
information is intended only for a corporate purpose and not for
the insider's own benefit; and (2) the inherent unfairness of the
trader taking advantage of that information knowing that it is
unavailable to others in the market."' That is, those whose
position gave them access to material nonpublic corporate informa-
tion would have a duty to disclose that information or abstain from
trading.
1 8 5
The opinion in Cady, Roberts significantly broadened the
category of people who have a duty to refrain from trading on
material nonpublic information. After the opinion, liability under
Rule 10b-5 could be based on the fact that an investor had access to
material nonpublic information, traded on that inside information
without first disclosing it, and thereby took advantage of those with
whom the investor dealt. This would be so even if that investor was
not a statutory insider, as Gintel was not. 86 The "fairness" theory
of Cady, Roberts finds its rationale in the goal of achieving "[a] sense
of integrity and fairness in the market [which is not possible] if the
system countenances transactions in which one party has inside
information unavailable to the other."
187
Expanding on Cady, Roberts's fairness theory, the Second Circuit,
sitting en banc, declared that Rule 10b-5 and the disclose-or-abstain
rule announced in Cady, Roberts are applicable to those who are not
traditional corporate insiders. 8 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.,' Texas Gulf Sulphur ("TGS"), a mining company, had been
conducting geophysical surveys in eastern Canada for a number of
18sId. at 912.
184See id.
18 See id. at 911.
186See id. at 912.
187 The Supreme Cour4 1982 Term-Federal Statutes and Regulations, 97 HARv. L. REv.
230, 291-92 (1983).
"s See Alan R. Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its
Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 739-40 (1968).
189 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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years. 90 In November of 1963, a test hole, K-55-1, near Timmins,
Ontario produced indications of very high concentrations of copper,
zinc, and silver.19 ' This discovery ultimately uncovered one of the
largest copper/zinc deposits in North America.192 In response to
these test results, the President of TGS, Claude 0. Stephens,
instructed that leases on adjacent land parcels be purchased so that
the company could expand its ownership of the mineral rights in
the deposit. 93  To facilitate the acquisition of these leases,
Stephens instructed the geological exploration group to keep the
test results confidential, even from other officers and directors of
the corporation.'9 4 Before TGS released the news of the strike to
the public, various TGS employees, including four members of the
geological team, the President, the Executive Vice President, the
general council, a director, and several people who had received tips
from a TGS officer bought TGS stock and call options on the mar-
ket.195 From the period before K-55-1 was drilled to shortly after
TGS finally made a formal press release outlining the magnitude of
the strike, the price of the company's stock more than tripled.'96
The Second Circuit held that the disclose-or-abstain rule
espoused in Cady, Roberts was a legitimate method of arresting
insider trading.197 The court expanded application of the rule,
however, to "anyone in possession of material inside informa-
tion."19 Thus, if a trader in possession of material inside infor-
mation is precluded from disclosure due to a corporate confidence
or simply chooses not to disclose, he must abstain from trading.
The court expunged the requirement of a special relationship giving
access to the inside information as a basis for liability, citing
congressional intent evidenced by Rule lOb-5 "that all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information."' 9 Therefore, after Texas Gulf Sulphur, any
access to nonpublic material information carried with it a corre-
sponding duty to disclose or abstain. This duty would apply
190 See id. at 843.
191 See id.
192 See id. at 850.
'93 See id. at 843.
19 See id.
195 See id. at 844.
"9 See id. at 847.
197 See id. at 848.
1
9
8 Id.
199 Id.
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whether the investor directly received the information from a
corporate insider or simply overheard it in passing on the
street.
00
The implementation of the policy in Texas Gulf Sulphur
approaches adoption of a "parity-of-information" theory.201  If
every investor who is in possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion has a duty to disclose that information prior to trading,
20 2
and if markets are efficient with respect to public information,
20 3
all investors will be trading in reliance on the same information. In
adopting this approach, the Second Circuit was expressing a
primary concern with the basic problems of unfairness and lack of
investor confidence in the market that tolerance of insider trading
creates 204 -concerns that the Commission had cited as the under-
pinnings of insider trading regulation.
20 5
The Texas Gulf Sulphur court's decision, however, went too far.
In Cady, Roberts, the Commission advocated adopting an "equal-
access theory."206  An equal-access theory seeks to ensure that
2' The court limited its holding somewhat by stating that
ft]he only regulatory objective is that access to material information be
enjoyed equally, but this objective requires nothing more than the disclosure
of basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative expertise
in reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge equal to that of
the insiders.
Id. at 849.
201 A theory that encourages trades in which all investors rely on the same
information is known as a parity-of-information theory. See Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 231-34 (1980). Such a theory would hold that a duty to disclose would
.arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." Id. at 235. This
theory of liability was rejected by the Supreme Court. See id. at 233-35.
21 See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
203 See supra part I.A.3.
204 See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (finding that the purpose of§ 10(b) was
to "prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities
transactions generally").
20 See supra part I.B.
2 6 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 (1961). Professor Brudney was
one of the first to suggest application of an "equality-of-access" theory to govern the
legality of insider trading. The theory is based on the "conception of 'unfairness' in
the Cady, Roberts opinion on a premise of investor expectations regarding the relative
accessibility of corporate information in market participants." Brudney, supra note
102, at 353-54. The theory provides that "[p]ersons having access to confidential
material information that is not legally available to others generally are prohibited by
Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their... advantage through trading
in affected securities." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 251 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). As a result, the theory would
deny an informational advantage to those who seek to use otherwise
nonpublic information which they are precluded by legal restrictions from
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through diligence, investigation, and analysis all investors will have
access to the same information. It does not seek to ensure that each
investor in a transaction actually rely on the same information.
20 7
Courts eventually began to point out a problem with the parity-of-
information theory as advocated in Texas Gulf Sulphur. The policy
of imposing on investors an over-inclusive duty to disclose deters
the free flow of information. 2"8 The Supreme Court believed that
the detrimental effect of requiring full disclosure outweighed the
benefits it provided."' Security analysts and other market partici-
pants whose job it is to ferret out information should be permitted
to trade on that information without having to disclose it to their
trading counterparts. 210 Adopting such a policy provides incen-
tives to unearth information not known by the markets, which
investors will then discount into the price of the security, providing
more accurate stock valuations by the market.
2 "
The high point in the expansion of Rule 10b-5 is perhaps
marked by Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.21 2 In this case, the
Supreme Court held that if a Rule lOb-5 civil action involves a
failure to disclose rather than an affirmative misrepresentation,
"positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that
is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that
a reasonable investor might have considered them important
... 213 At common law, proof of reliance is a crucial element in
proving an action for fraud.2 4  The Court's removal of this
disclosing to public investors. And it may appropriately extend to those
who, while not precluded by law from waiving their informational
advantage, derive it from sources who will not make it public, so that the
public cannot lawfully obtain it.
Brudney, supra note 102, at 355.
207 Cf supra note 201.
20 In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the Court asserted that, "[i]mposing a
duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material
nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting
influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary
to the preservation of a healthy market." Id. at 658.
201 See id.
210 See id. at 658-59.
2 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibi-
tions Against Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights Theoy of Inside Information Is
Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 153 n.18 (1993) (book review).
212 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
215 Id. at 153-54.
2"14 The plaintiff must show that he justifiably relied on the defendant's
misrepresentation and that the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff's reliance
on that misrepresentation. See supra note 29 (setting forth the elements of common
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requirement reflected the flexibility that it was willing to read into
Rule 10b-5. Under Chief Justice Warren Burger, however, the
Court eventually began to narrow significantly the scope of Rule
10b-5.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,215 the Court limited
the private right of action established in Kardon 16 for Rule 10b-5
cases to only those defrauded investors who actually purchased or
sold securities.217 Thus, the Court found that Rule 10b-5 is aimed
only at injury suffered in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.2"' The insider who trades on the basis of material nonpublic
information also has breached a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
who have not transacted in the stock of the corporation, but
according to Blue Chip Stamps, the connection between the fraud
and the insider transaction is insufficient for a Rule 10b-5 claim.
The Court foreclosed any notion that every breach of fiduciary duty
is sufficient to support a claim of securities fraud.
Two years after it began to narrow the private right of action
under Rule 10b-5, the Burger Court attacked the substantive
applicability of the Rule in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.
219
Santa Fe Industries owned 95% of the stock of Kirby Lumber.
220
Pursuant to applicable Delaware short-form merger provisions, a
parent corporation that owns 90% of the stock of a subsidiary may
cash out the minority shareholders without their consent or without
giving advance notice. 221 A minority stockholder dissatisfied with
the terms of the merger, however, may then petition the Delaware
Court of Chancery for an appraisal of the fair value of the
stock. 2  Santa Fe Industries complied with all of the terms of the
short-form merger statute.22' The minority shareholders were
law fraud).
215 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
211 See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
217 See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731-49. Citing concern that Rule 1Ob-5 was
being abused and causing unwarranted "vexatious litigation," the Court excluded
those investors who relied by refraining from purchasing or selling stock in response
to a defendant's misrepresentation, therefore subsequently missing profits or taking
a loss when the true value of the stock was revealed. See id. at 740-41.218 See id. at 747.
219 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
220 See id. at 465.
221 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974 & Supp. 1995).
22 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.
223 See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 466.
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dissatisfied, however, with the purchase price of $150 per share.
224
Instead of petitioning the Delaware Chancery Court, however, they
opted to commence an action in federal court.225 The sharehold-
ers alleged a violation of Rule 10b-5 on the theory that their stock
was unfairly undervalued by Santa Fe Industries and that the merger
served no valid business purpose except to freeze out the minority
shareholders.
226
Reasoning that section 10(b) was intended to provide a remedy
for transactions in which investors had been defrauded, the Court
rejected the minority shareholders' arguments, holding that "the
transaction, if carried out as alleged in the complaint, was neither
deceptive nor manipulative and therefore did not violate either
§ 10(b) of the Act or Rule 10b-5." 227 Instead, the Court held that
the fundamental purpose of the antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act is to implement a "philosophy of full disclosure."
228
When full and fair disclosure has occurred, "the fairness of the
terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the
statute."229
The early cases interpreting Rule 10b-5 such as Cady, Roberts and
Santa Fe Industries provided a substructure for the Court on which
it could construct the framework that today makes up traditional
insider trading theory. The landmark case of Chiarella v. United
States21° provided the first girder in this framework.
3. The Breach of Duty Requirement
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of an
individual's duty to disclose material nonpublic information. It
abrogated any notion that either the parity-of-information theo-
ry231 or the equal-access theory232 could provide a basis for Rule
lOb-5 liability.23 3 Ostensibly adopting the rationale set forth in
Cady, Roberts,2 34 the Court maintained that a duty to disclose must
24 See id.
2- See id. at 467.
226 See id. at 465-70.
1 7 Id. at 474.
22 Id. at 478.
229 Id.
230 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
231 See supra note 201.
232 See supra note 206.
233 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231 n.14.
234 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see also supra text accompanying note 184 (setting forth
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be based on the common law requirement for fraud: the existence
of a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence
between the seller and purchaser of securities.
23 5
Vincent Chiarella was a "markup man" for Pandick Press, a
financial printing company, and as a result of his employment had
access to confidential information regarding pending tender
offers.23 6  Offering corporations would bring documents to
Chiarella's employer for printing in preparation for disclosure to
the public.2 7 Despite the efforts of the offering corporations to
blank out the names of the target corporations, Chiarella was often
able to ascertain the identities of the target corporations before they
were publicly announced.3 8 In five instances, Chiarella made
trades in the stock of the target corporation, without disclosure,
before the news of the tender offer or merger was divulged.2 9 As
a result of his trades, Chiarella was able to obtain in excess of
$30,000 in profits.24 °
Although Chiarella was an outsider to the target corporations in
which he traded securities, and although his employer had no
relationship with those corporations nor owed a duty to the
corporations under any legal theory, Chiarella was investigated,
indicted, and found guilty of violating Rule 10b-5.24 1 On appeal,
the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that Chiarella
knew that the information he possessed was nonpublic and that
trading while in possession of nonpublic information violates Rule
10b-5.242  The Supreme Court disagreed and overturned the
conviction. 24 3 The majority of the Court, adhering to a traditional
notion of insider trading, held that when trading on material
nonpublic information, failure to disclose that information prior to
trading is fraudulent only when there is a duty to disclose.
244
the principal elements of the disclose-or-abstain rule).
"3 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 ("When an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty to
disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information.").
236 See id. at 224.
217 See id.
2 See id.
239 See id.
240 See id.
2'41 See Chiarella, No. 77-2534, 1977 SEC LEXIS 1674, at *2 (May 25, 1977).
212 See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1368 (2d Cir. 1978).
243 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.
244 See id. at 235.
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Mere possession of material nonpublic information does not
produce a duty to disclose nor to refrain from trading.24 5 Because
Chiarella had no prior dealings with the shareholders of the target
corporations and had no other relationship with them, his failure to
disclose the information on which he traded did not constitute
fraud.246
The Chiarella Court narrowed the analysis of Cady, Roberts and
Texas Gulf Sulphur,247 to require a breach of a fiduciary duty or
similar relationship of trust and confidence by a "person in whom
the sellers had placed their trust and confidence" to support liabili-
ty. 248 One rationale for this holding is that the Court was con-
cerned that requiring analysts and traders to fully investigate the
source of the information on which they trade in order to prevent
prosecution would prohibit rapid trading on "rumors, hearsay, and
other common sources of information." 249 Furthermore, Justice
Powell asserted that finding Rule 10b-5 liability under the equal-
access theory suffered from two defects. First, although it may be
unfair that certain individuals in the market have superior access to
information, Santa Fe Industries held that not every instance of
financial unfairness constitutes fraud.250 Second, adoption of the
equal-access theory would recognize a "general duty between all
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on
material nonpublic information."251
The current state of traditional insider trading theory is
demarcated by the holdings in Chiarella and Dirks v. SEC.252 Dirks
245 The Court stated, "[w]e hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information. The contrary result
is without support in the legislative history of§ 10(b) and would be inconsistent with
the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of the securities markets."
Id.
246 See id. at 232.
24 Referring to the equal-access theory, the Court stated: "We see no basis for
applying such a new and different theory of liability in this case." Id. at 234. For a
discussion of the equal access theory, see supra note 206. For a discussion of Cady,
Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur, see supra notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
248 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. The Court believed that recognizing a general duty
of disclosure where one party had possession of material nonpublic information
would be to read the Exchange Act "'more broadly than [the] language and the
statutory scheme reasonably permit.'" Id. at 234 (quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103,
116 (1978)).
249 Fisch, supra note 55, at 182.2-o See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. For a discussion of Santa Fe Industries, see supra
notes 219-29 and accompanying text.
2" Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
252 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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reaffirmed the Chiarella holding, which limited the scope of Rule
10b-5 to instances involving the breach of a fiduciary duty or other
special relationship of trust and confidence, and then defined those
situations in which Rule 10b-5 would encompass trades by tippees
of Chiarella-type holders of material nonpublic information.
Raymond Dirks was an officer of Delafield Childs, Inc., a New
York registered broker-dealer firm serving institutional inves-
tors.2 53 Dirks specialized in insurance company stocks and was
highly respected for his knowledge.254 In early 1973, Ronald
Secrist was fired from his job as an officer at Bankers National, a
New Jersey life insurance company. 25 5 Four years earlier, Bankers
National had been acquired by Equity Funding of America, a
diversified company selling primarily life insurance and mutual
funds.25 6 Shortly after being fired, Secrist called Dirks to inform
him that Equity Funding had vastly overstated its assets as a result
of several fraudulent corporate practices, 25 7 including the creation
of phony policies. 25 8 To investigate the allegations, Dirks flew to
Los Angeles and interviewed several Equity Funding employees,
some of whom were willing to corroborate Secrist's charges.
259
While in Los Angeles, Dirks was in contact with a number of
investors and analysts, both to try to obtain any information they
might have about the fraud and because the investors and analysts
were clients or potential clients of Dirks.26" Dirks openly dis-
cussed the investigation and his findings with anyone who
asked.261' Dirks also contacted the Los Angeles bureau chief for
the Wall Street Journal, William Blundell, and kept him up to date on
the status of the investigation.26 2 Blundell did not believe that
such a massive fraud could go undetected, however, and thought
that publishing such damaging hearsay would be libelous.26 3 As
a result of speaking with Dirks, several investors quickly began
liquidating their positions in Equity Funding stock, selling close to
$15.5 million worth of stock and $1 million of convertible deben-
s See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).25 See id.
255 See id.
2
5 See id.
25
7 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 649 (1983).
2
5 See Dirks, 681 F.2d at 829.
29 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.26 See Dirks, 681 F.2d at 831.
261 See id.
262 See id.
263 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649-50.
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tures before the New York Stock Exchange halted trading to
investigate the abnormal trading in the company.264 Only then
did the SEC file a complaint against Equity Funding and the Wall
Street Journal print a front-page story.265 Judge-Wright stated that
"[1]argely thanks to Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent
memory was uncovered and exposed, while the record shows that
the SEC repeatedly missed opportunities to investigate Equity
Funding."
266
Nevertheless, the SEC charged and convicted Dirks of violations
of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws for disclosing
information from his investigation to investors. 26' The SEC based
his conviction on the assertion that "[w]here 'tippees'-regardless of
their motivation or occupation-come into possession of material
'corporate information that they know is confidential and know or
should know came from a corporate insider,' they must either
publicly disclose that information or refrain from trading."
268
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed Dirks's conviction,269 but the Supreme Court
reversed.
271
The Court's opinion began by stating that there is no duty to
disclose when.the person who traded, "'was not [the corporation's]
agent, .... was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the
sellers . . . had placed their trust and confidence.'"2 71 The Court
then explicitly rejected the SEC's position that a tippee inherits the
Cady, Roberts duty272 whenever he knowingly receives inside
information from an insider who by virtue of his position would
have been barred from trading.273 Yet again, the Court expressed
its belief that an overbroad interpretation of the antifraud provi-
sions, such as that of the SEC, would inhibit the role of market
analysts in preserving the efficiency of the market.2 4 Analysts
264 See Dirks, 681 F.2d at 831.
265 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650.
266 Dirks, 681 F.2d at 829.
267 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650-51.
26' Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (Jan. 22,
1981) [hereinafter Dirks Release] (footnote omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).
269 See Dirks, 681 F.2d at 846.
270 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
271 Id. at 654 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (first, second, and third alterations
in original)).
272 See supra text accompanying note 184.
273 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58.
274 See id. at 658. "'The value to the entire market of [analysts'] efforts cannot be
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often meet with insiders and other company employees to gather
information from which they are able to assess the market value of
a corporation's securities. Because they would knowingly be
receiving information from a corporate insider, analysts would
constantly have to verify if the information was already public, or
could be legitimately made public, or face the censure of the
SEC.27 5
Instead, the Court determined that tippees can only inherit the
Cady, Roberts duty when they receive information improperly or for
a confidential corporate purpose.27' The Court announced that
a tippee will be deemed to have improperly received the informa-
tion only if two conditions are met. First, the insider must have
breached a fiduciary duty to the shareholders in disclosing the
information to the tippee.277  Recognizing that insiders often
disclose information to analysts consistent with shareholder
interests, the Court limited a breach of fiduciary duty to those
instances in which the insider made the disclosure for a direct, or
indirect, personal benefit.278 This personal benefit includes both
"pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into
future earnings." 279 Second, the tippee will be subject to a duty
to disclose or abstain only if he is aware, or reasonably should be
aware, of the insider's breach. 2 " The Court then concluded that
because Secrist had not given Dirks the information for his personal
benefit, but merely to expose the fraud occurring at Equity Funding,
Dirks had not inherited a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
281
gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to
ferret out and analyze information, and thus the analyst's work redounds to the
benefit of all investors.'" Id. at 658 n.17 (quoting Dirks Release, supra note 268, at
1406 (alterations in original)).
27 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
276 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
277 See id.
27S See id. at 662. The Court based this requirement on the language in Cady,
Roberts that the purpose of the securities laws is to eliminate the "'use of inside
information for personal advantage.'" Id. (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
912 n.15 (1961)).
279 Id. at 663. The Court went on to provide examples of instances in which it
would be presumed that the information was tipped for a personal benefit: (1) where
the relationship between the insider and the tippee suggests a quid pro quo and (2)
a gift of the information to a family member or friend (because this is no different
than the insider trading himself and giving the profits to the family member). See id.
at 664.
2
10 See id. at 660.
281 See id. at 666-67.
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The Dirks Court staunchly stood by the established doctrine of
insider liability based on a breach of fiduciary duty or similar
relationship of trust and confidence, but expanded its scope to
tippees who facilitate a fraud after an insider's breach.
In dictum, the Dirks Court further expanded liability to an
additional group of tippees known as "quasi-insiders," those who
have received information for a corporate purpose.
28 2
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information
is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may
become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing
this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have
entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes.
283
Although no true fiduciary duty exists between tippees or quasi-
insiders and corporate shareholders, the Dirks Court again ex-
pressed its willingness to expand liability beyond traditional
corporate insiders. This indicates that the Court was willing to
place more emphasis on effecting the purposes of Rule 10b-5 than
on adhering to constricted notions of fiduciary duties. The Court,
however, clearly indicated the necessity for workable boundaries
under an expanded theory of traditional liability.
28 4
4. The Chiarella-Dirks Hole
The Court's decisions construing the traditional theory of
insider trading have substantially limited the areas encompassed by
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Court has attempted to define
the circumstances under which liability for trading on the basis of
material inside information will attach, and to limit those situations
to instances in which there has been a breach of fiduciary duty or
282 See id. at 655 n.14.
2a3 Id.
21 See id. ("For such a duty to be imposed [on quasi-insiders] the corporation must
expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the
relationship at least must imply such a duty."); see also id. at 665 ("But to determine
whether the disclosure itself 'deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]' shareholders...
the initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. This
requires the courts to focus on objective criteria .... " (citation omitted) (emphasis
added) (first, second, and third alterations in original)).
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of a similar relationship of trust and confidence. 285 In doing so,
the Supreme Court has attempted to provide clear guidance as to
who holds the Cady, Roberts duty to disclose or abstain from
trading.
28 6
First, those who hold a fiduciary duty to a corporation's
shareholders, also known as true insiders, are subject to the Cady,
Roberts duty.2 8 7 To ensure that insider trading law is expansive
enough to promote investor confidence in the capital markets, the
Supreme Court has taken a broad view of the type of relationship
with a corporation that will impart a fiduciary or other relationship
of trust and confidence. All persons who enjoy "a relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose," 288 are presumed to share
a fiduciary relationship with the shareholders. In Dirks, the Court
assumed that the employees, many of whom were not directors or
officers, who gave inside information to Dirks were subject to a
fiduciary duty. 2 9  In Chiarella, the Court reaffirmed the SEC's
position that a special relationship of trust and confidence exists
between "shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with
that corporation."
290
Second, under Dirks, tippees who improperly receive corporate
information from a trfie insider and trade on that basis derivatively
breach the Cady, Roberts duty.291 This prevents true insiders from
circumventing application of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws. For example, suppose that Claude 0. Stephens in
Texas Gulf Sulphur29 2 agreed with a CEO at another company to
keep each other apprised of material events within their respective
corporations. Although Stephens as a true insider could not trade
on news of the mine strike, without a restriction on tippee trading
he could notify the other CEO who could trade. Stephens would
281 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
286 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
287 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
2 8 
Id.
211 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 (1983).
:': Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (citing Brophy v. Cities
Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. Ch. 1949) (holding that an employee of the corporation
who bought stock in the company on the basis of inside information breached a duty
to the corporate shareholders)).
291 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664; supra note 184 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 189-211 and accompanying text.
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then reap future gains when his tippee "paid him back" with
information about the other company.
Third, the Court added an additional group, "quasi-insiders,"
to those who are under the duty to disclose or abstain from
trading. 293 The Court apparently perceived a need to prohibit
outsiders to the corporation to whom corporate information
was disclosed for a proper purpose from trading on that infor-
mation.
The structure of traditional insider trading theory, however, fails
to address trading by outsiders on the basis of material nonpublic
information who do not breach a duty to the corporation in which
they trade.2 94  But in such situations fairness dictates that a
penalty still ought to apply. An employee of a computer chip
manufacturer, Intel, for example, may learn during the course of his
employment that Intel has discovered a cheaper way to produce
computer chips that will lower the production costs of computer
manufacturers, such as Dell Computers. The employee would not
be liable under traditional theory for trading in Dell stock prior to
dissemination of this information to the public, however, because
the employee is not in a fiduciary relationship with the stockholders
of Dell Computers. Furthermore, under traditional theory Vincent
Chiarella was not liable when he "misappropriated-stole to put it
bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the
utmost confidence,"2 95 because he owed no fiduciary duty to those
with whom he traded in the market. 296 The failure of traditional
theory to address these situations has left a void in the securities
laws. As a result, the traditional theory's emphasis on the neces-
sity of a fiduciary relationship has become the linchpin in the
current drive toward redefining insider trading. Permitting
Chiarella, a corporate outsider, to escape from the disclose-or-
abstain rule hastened the development of a surrogate approach, the
misappropriation theory, to reach those who secretly trade on
3 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665 n.14.
' See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that an
outsider who traded on material nonpublic information was not liable under the Dirks
standard because he was an eavesdropper and the information was not disclosed for
the benefit of the insider).
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
See Anne Hunter, Note, Does Rule 10b-5 Cover Misappropriators? A Look at the
United States Supreme Court's Indecision in United States v. Carpenter, 18 Sw. U. L.
REV. 79, 87-88 (1988).
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another's market information, but who are not covered by tradi-
tional theory.
C. The Hole the Misappropriation Theory Seeks to Fill
1. Definition of the Misappropriation Theory
Commentators generally credit Chief Justice Burger with first
proposing application of the misappropriation theory297 in his
dissent in Chiarella v. United States.298  Burger agreed that an
omission is fraudulent only when there is a duty to disclose.
2 99
Such a rule is necessary, he argues, because it "permits a business-
man to capitalize on his experience and skill in securing and
evaluating relevant information; it provides incentive for hard work,
careful analysis, and astute forecasting.""' To hold that mere
possession of nonpublic information produces a duty to disclose
that information or refrain from trading would stifle these socially
desirable activities." 1 Permitting trades on the basis of informa-
tion that is obtained through "unlawful means," however, is bereft
of socially desirable incentives.1 2 The Chief Justice reasoned that
in these circumstances, application of the misappropriation theory
would create a duty to disclose."' He concluded that Chiarella
would be found guilty of securities fraud under such a theory.30 4
Under Burger's interpretation of Rule 10b-5, "a person who has
misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to
disclose that information or to refrain from trading."0 5 It is
irrelevant whether the duty held by the trader runs to the issuer of
the securities.
The form of the misappropriation theory actually adopted by
lower courts, however, is more accurately stated as follows: "[I]t is
"9 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciay Duties into the
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1189, 1196 (1995).
29 445 U.S. at 239-45 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
9 See id. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
o See id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 242-43 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
N2 Id.
3o3 See id.
... See id. The majority refused to find Chiarella guilty under the misappro-
priation theory because they felt that it had not been properly submitted for con-
sideration by the jury at trial. See id. at 223. But cf. id. at 243 (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that the jury instructions were sufficient for application of the
theory).
05 Id. at 240 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security-and
therefore a violation of Rule 10b-5-for a person to trade in
securities in breach of fiduciary duty by secretly converting for
personal use information that has been entrusted to him."'0 6 The
difference between the two formulations, although a technical one,
is that under Burger's theory the trader assumes the Cady, Roberts
duty to disclose or refrain from trading.117 Under the formulation
actually adopted by the courts, however, the trader commits fraud
only when he either trades on information improperly obtained or
improperly trades on information properly obtained.0 8
2. Application of the Misappropriation Theory
Federal prosecutors and judges recognized that the failure of the
securities laws to encompass all trading on material nonpublic
information creates a perception of injustice."0 9 Into this gap in
1o DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND
PREVENTION § 6.01, at 6-1 (1993). The Ninth Circuit defined the misappropriation
theory as follows:
Rule 10b-5 is violated when a person (1) misappropriates material nonpublic
information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and
confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4)
regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded
stock.
SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990).
... See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
"' See Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect
on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1294 n.101 (1984). Langevoort pointed out
that
[tihe misappropriation theory is in distinct contrast to the rationale
suggested by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Chiarella. Burger's
theory is that a person who misappropriates information comes under a
duty to disclose the information to anyone with whom he trades. This
theory has not received affirmative judicial recognition.
Id. (citations omitted).
" See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1981) (formulating the
indictment to remedy the Chiarella deficiency); see also Ronald F. Kidd, Insider
Trading: The Misappropriation Theoy Versus an "Access to Information" Perspective, 18
DEL.J. CORP. L. 101, 117 (1993) (noting that the failure of the federal securities laws
to encompass all outsider trading creates a perception of extreme unfairness and
injustice in the financial markets); Note, Insider Trading inJunk Bonds, 105 HARv. L.
REV. 1720, 1734 (1992) (suggesting that courts developed the misappropriation theory
as a reaction to the Chiarella decision).
PerhapsJustice Blackmun put it best in his Chiarella dissent when he observed
that "[t]he Court continues to pursue a course, charted in certain recent decisions,
designed to transform § 10(b) from an intentionally elastic 'catchall' provision to one
that catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes investment in
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securities regulation the Second Circuit infused the misappropria-
tion theory. The theory was first employed to impose Rule 10b-5
liability in 1981.10 In a later case, the Second Circuit reaffirmed
application of the theory in a situation remarkably similar to that in
Chiarella. ' In SEC v. Materia,3 ' Materia was also employed by a
financial printer but was a "copyholder" who read drafts of
prospectuses and other financial documents aloud to a proof-
reader."' The proofreader would then check page proofs against
the copy received from the client." Because he was an avid
market watcher, Materia was able to deduce the identities of four
tender offer targets despite the fact that their names had been
omitted from the documents. 4 Using this information, Materia
purchased stock in the target companies before the tender offers
were publicly announced. 15 Within days of the public announce-
ments, he sold his holdings for significant gains. 6
The Materia court announced that "one who misappropriates
nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty and trades on
that information to his own advantage violates Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5."317 Citing section 395 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency,318 the court maintained that by misappropriating informa-
securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor." Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980) (Blackmun,J., dissenting). "The common theme of
the misappropriation cases is the sense that it is unfair to allow people to buy or sell
securities based on information that they acquired under questionable circumstances,
or information that they received entirely appropriately, but was not theirs to use for
their own personal gain." Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory
Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b),
59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 144 (1995).
"' See Newman, 664 F.2d at 16 (finding a Rule lOb-5 violation despite the fact that
information was gained from an investment bank that did not hold shares of the
traded company's stock).
S 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
312 See id. at 199.
SS See id.
314 See id.
31 See id.
s" Materia's trades netted him nearly $100,000. See id. at 200.
317 Id. at 203.
s' The section states that
an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate
information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him
during the course of or on account of his agency ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
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tion from his employer, Materia "perpetrated a fraud" which gave
rise to a duty to refrain from trading.
319
Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively on the
validity of the misappropriation theory as applied to Rule 10b-5, the
theory has been adopted by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits,1 20 but has recently been rejected by the Fourth Circuit.
3 21
Even so, when the Court had the opportunity to address application
of the misappropriation theory in Carpenter v. United States3 22 it
failed to do so and instead based liability on the federal mail and
wire fraud statutes. 23
In Carpenter, Foster Winans, a reporter for the Wall Street
Journal, was responsible for a daily column entitled "Heard on the
Street."3 24 The column presented a selection of stocks and made
recommendations with regard to investment possibilities.3 25 The
market price of stocks analyzed in the column were regularly
affected because of the perceived quality and integrity of the
column and its analysis.- 26  Winans was familiar with the official
Journal policy that prior to publication the contents of the column
were the Journal's confidential property.3 27 Nevertheless, Winans
gave advance information as to the contents of the column to
several friends, allowing them to place trades on that basis.
32 8
Winans and his accomplices together obtained some $690,000 in
profits.
3 29
"9 Materia, 745 F.2d at 202.
'2 1 See United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1991) (employing the
misappropriation theory as applied to mail fraud), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 961 (1992);
SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming the district court's
application of the misappropriation theory to find Rule IOb-5 liability); Materia, 745
F.2d at 202 (holding that the misappropriation of nonpublic information "falls
squarely within the 'fraud or deceit' language of... Rule [10b-5]").
321 See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting application
of the misappropriation theory to a West Virginia Lottery Director who traded on
information that the lottery would award two key contracts prior to its public
announcement).
32 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
s1- See id. at 24 (affirming the lower court's convictions under the mail and wire
fraud statutes by a majority of the Court, but affirming the convictions under the
securities laws only because the Court was evenly divided).
324 See id. at 22.
325 See id.
326 See id.
327 See id. at 23.
328 See id.
s29 See id.
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Winans was charged with federal mail and wire fraud violations
as well as with Rule 10b-5 violations.330  The latter charge
stemmed from his breach of a contractual duty to his employer by
"misappropriating prepublication information ... that had been
gained in the course of his employment under the understanding
that it would not be revealed in advance of publication."
331
Although the Journal was not a buyer or seller of the stocks traded
and had not traded in the market, the fraud was nevertheless
considered to be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of
securities under Rule 10b-5.332 The district court reasoned that
Winans's scheme was developed with the purpose to buy and sell
securities in advance of the column's publication.3 33 The Second
Circuit affirmed Winans's conviction on the theory that Winans had
misappropriated property (that is, information) from the Journal in
violation of a work rule.33 4  The Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed the Second Circuit convictions for violations of the mail
and wire fraud statutes,335 but was "evenly divided with respect to
the convictions under the securities laws and for that reason
affirm[ed] the judgment below on those counts."336
Citing the Court's flaccid decision, one commentator stated that,
"while the Court's indecision gave prosecutors a boost by not
removing a weapon from their arsenal, it left insider trading lawjust
as nebulous as before." 337 Accordingly, the affirmance carries little
precedential weight, 338 for although
the conspiracy was: (1) aimed directly at the securities market; (2)
the corporation whose information was misappropriated was the
preeminent financial newspaper in the world; and, (3) the
defendants actually made over $690,000 in insider profits, there
were still only four votes on the Supreme Court to sustain the
conviction!
33 9
33o See id.
s31 Id. at 24.
332 See id.
s33 See id.
334 See id. at 28.
333 The defendant was charged with violation of § 1343 as well as § 1341 of 18
U.S.C. See id. at 24.
s36 Id.
3s7 Hunter, supra note 296, at 79.
338 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
("Supreme Court support for the misappropriation theory is still unclear."), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
33' Richard Neely, Insider Trading Prosecutions Under the Misappropriation Theory:
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Even so, because the Court was willing to transmogrify the act of
embezzlement into an act of fraud on the person from whom the
information was purloined, it, even if implicitly, indicated that the
misappropriation theory may be a viable legal theory.
3 40
After Carpenter, the element of a "'fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence' 3 41 takes on new importance.
This is because a "fraud-on-the-source theory of liability extends the
focus of Rule 10b-5 beyond the confined sphere of fiduciary/-
shareholder relations to fiduciary breaches of any sort, a particularly
broad expansion of 10b-5 liability if the add-on, a 'similar relation-
ship of trust and confidence' is construed liberally."3 42  The
concern for this breadth of interpretation is heightened because
whereas fiduciary relationships in the field of shareholder relations
are dearly circumscribed,3 43 fiduciary relationships in other
settings are "anything but clear."344 The Carpenter decision placed
no limits on the application of the misappropriation theory and
suggests that virtually anyone who trades on material nonpublic
information may fall within the scope of section 10(b).
In 1992, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, revisited the
misappropriation theory. The court's principal concern in United
States v. Chestman345 was to determine "what constitutes a fiduciary
or similar relationship of trust and confidence in the context of
Rule l0b-5."346 Even following this case, the answer remains far
from clear.
Robert Chestman was a broker who traded on nonpublic
information about a forthcoming tender offer for the stock of
New York's Joke on Heartland America, 1994 WL 267860, at *19. Neely is ajustice (and
former chiefjustice) of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. His article tries
to read between the lines of the confidential 4-4 vote of the Supreme Court: "I called
Justice White and asked whether the vote was confidential or simply had not been
reported. That, according tojustice White, the vote was confidential tells me that the
Justices somehow intuited that a court-generated 'misappropriation theory' is a
slippery slope .... " Id.
340 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27 ("The concept of 'fraud' includes the act of
embezzlement, which is 'the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money
or goods entrusted to one's care by another.'" (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181,
189 (1902))).
141 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
142 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567 (quoting without citation).
34s See id.
344 Id.
s45 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
346 Id. at 567.
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Waldbaum, Inc., a large supermarket chain. 4 7 Chestman had
received the information from Keith Loeb who was married to the
niece of Ira Waldbaum, the controlling shareholder of Waldbaum,
Inc. 4 ' Waldbaum told his sister, Shirley Witkin, three of his
children, and a nephew that he had agreed to sell the corporation
to Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc. ("A & P"),
admonishing them to keep the news confidential. 4 9 Witkin in
turn told her daughter, who then revealed it to her husband."'
Between Loeb and Chestman there was no breach of trust or theft
of information.
Accordingly, the court stated that Chestman's convictions under
Rule lOb-5 could not be sustained unless "(1) Keith Loeb breached
a duty owed to the Waldbaum family or Susan Loeb based on a
fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence, and (2)
Chestman knew that Loeb had done so." 5 1 With five judges on
the panel dissenting, the sharply divided court reversed Chestman's
conviction under Rule lOb-5, holding that a "fiduciary duty cannot
be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential
information."352 Furthermore the court found that a familial
relationship is itself not enough to establish a confidential relation-
ship.5 3 Instead, a "'similar relationship of trust and confidence'
... must be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relation-
ship." 54 Beyond this, however, the court offered no guidance as
to what relationships would be encompassed within the term
"fiduciary."
Although the court was concerned that its "efforts to construe
Rule lOb-5 [may] lose method and predictability, taking over 'the
whole corporate universe,'" '55 it broadened the misappropriation
theory immeasurably by encompassing "fiduciary breaches of any
sort."356 The court did point out that it had limited application
of the misappropriation theory to the context of employment
relationships, but that district courts in the Second Circuit had
s47 See id. at 555.
348 See id.
349 See id.
350 See id.
s51 Id. at 564.
- 21 Id. at 567.
.5 See id. at 568.
54 Id. (citation omitted).
... Id. at 567 (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1377 (2d Cir.
1978) (MeskillJ., dissenting), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
S56Id.
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applied it to even broader circumstances."' Still, the court was
willing to say that where any fiduciary relationship existed, the
misappropriation theory could be applied. Accordingly, under the
misappropriation theory after Chestman there is no requirement that
(1) the "buyer or seller of securities be defrauded" 5 8 or (2) the
fiduciary duty be limited to the "confined sphere of fiduciary/
shareholder relations."3
59
Following Chestman, it seemed as though any breach of a
fiduciary relationship or a relationship that was the functional
equivalent would serve as a basis for application of the misappropri-
ation theory. This assertion was tested and proved correct in United
States v. Willis.3
60
Sanford I. Weill was CEO of Shearson Loeb Rhodes from 1970
to 1981.361 In 1981, Weill sold his controlling interest in Shearson
to the American Express Company and became president of
American Express. 62 By October of 1985, Weill was interested in
becoming CEO of BankAmerica, and as part of that effort secured
a commitment from Shearson to invest $1 billion in
BankAmerica.3 63  The investment was contingent upon Weill's
success in his endeavor.3 6 4 During the negotiation period with
BankAmerica, Weill often discussed his efforts to become CEO with
his wife, Joan Weill.165  At the time, Joan Weill was seeing a
psychiatrist, Robert Willis.- 66 Mrs. Weill told Dr. Willis both about
her husband's efforts to become CEO of BankAmerica and about
the contemplated Shearson investment.3 67 Before this information
3-1 See id. at 566 (citing United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y) (holding
that a son may breach a fiduciary duty to his father, a corporate director), rev'd on
other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985)).
358 Id.
3-9 Id. at 567.
" 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). The Willis case resulted in two separate opinions from the district court
involving Dr. Willis as a defendant. The first opinion, United States v. Willis, 737 F.
Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), denied a motion that the indictment against Dr. Willis be
dismissed. This opinion provides the facts of the case. The second opinion, United
States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), denies a second motion that the
indictment against Dr. Willis be dismissed following the en banc decision in Chestman,
947 F.2d 551.
... See Willis, 737 F. Supp. at 270.
362 See id.
363 See id.
364 See id.
365 See id.
36 See id. at 271.
367 See id.
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
became public, Dr. Willis purchased 13,000 shares of BankAmerica
and subsequently sold them at a profit of $27,475.79 after
BankAmerica announced that Weill was interested in becoming
CEO. 68
The government's indictment charged that Dr. Willis had
breached his physician-patient duty of confidentiality by misappro-
priating material nonpublic business information for his own benefit
and that he had illegally traded on the basis of that information.
3 69
According to the government, this breach was a fraud upon Mrs.
Weill in connection with the purchase of securities and therefore
was a violation of section 10(b).17' The court found that the
relationship between Dr. Willis and Mrs. Weill was a sufficient
predicate upon which to found a misappropriation theory of
liability. The court stated that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a
relationship that requires a higher degree of trust and confidence
than the traditional relationship of physician and patient."17 ' Dr.
Willis initially pled guilty to the charges, but later filed a motion to
withdraw his plea and moved to have the indictment dismissed
following the Chestman decision.
3 7 2
Willis contended that the indictment did not allege that Mrs.
Weill, his patient, had suffered any damages.3 73  The court
rejected this argument. The court found that a patient has a cause
of action against a psychiatrist who improperly discloses information
and also has a property interest in a continuing course of treatment
which is jeopardized by such disclosures.3 74  Consequently, the
court found that Mrs. Weill had been harmed. After having said
this, however, the court indicated that a finding of such harm was
not required for liability because "[i]n any event, the Second Circuit
ha[d] clearly and concisely stated 'that one who misappropriates
nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty and trades on
that information to his own advantage violates Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.' 3
7 5
s68 See id.
s9 See id. at 272.
370 See id.
371 Id. The court went on to point out that the Hippocratic oath concludes:
"'Whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, in my attendance on
the sick or even apart therefrom, which ought not be noised abroad, I will keep
silence thereon, counting such things to be as sacred secrets.'" Id. (quoting 15
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 95a (1971)).
"72 See United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
373 See Willis, 737 F. Supp. at 274.
374 See id.
171 Id. at 274-75 (quoting SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
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In his motion to dismiss, Dr. Willis also contended that
application of the misappropriation theory was limited in Chestman
to "fiduciary relationships that exist within the context of share-
holder relations or implicate the securities markets."176  He
contended that because the physician-patient relationship, although
perhaps fiduciary in nature, does not implicate either of these
requirements, a misappropriation theory of liability could not be
sustained.3 " The court rejected this argument, stating that the
Chestman court was concerned only with excluding from liability
"amorphous relationships of trust and confidence that are not
inherently fiduciary and well recognized as such."17 ' The court
argued that Chestman did not limit application of the misappropria-
tion theory only to those situations in which a breach of a fiduciary
relationship implicating the securities markets occurs. 79 Because
the physician-patient relationship has all the characteristics of a
"paradigmatic fiduciary relationship,""' the court found that a
breach of that relationship could well serve as a basis for liability
under the misappropriation theory.3 81
The misappropriation theory of liability was necessary to
convict Willis because Mrs. Weill did not breach a duty of trust
and confidence to her husband or the shareholders of BankAmerica
when she revealed the information to Dr. Willis. Therefore,
a charge of insider liability under traditional theory would not
have withstood Dr. Willis's motion to dismiss.3 8 2  The Willis
decision demonstrates, however, that the harm under misap-
propriation theory is often well removed from the securities
market. The asserted harm to Mrs. Weill, that she would have
to find another psychiatrist and may need further treatment
to overcome a possible mistrust in psychiatrists that this inci-
dent may have created, is wholly unrelated to any securities
transaction. "Today, aggrieved parties under Section 10(b) have
denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985)).
s76 Willis, 778 F. Supp. at 208.
37 See id.
171 Id. at 209.
39 See id. at 208-09.
sgp United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992). A "paradigmatic fiduciary relationship" involves two
characteristics: discretionary authority and dependency. See id.
... See Willis, 778 F. Supp. at 209.
' See supra part I.B.
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been transformed from 'the investing public' to 'the victims of the
theft.'
3 83
The end product of judicial wrangling with Rule 10b-5 bears
virtually no resemblance to the concept of insider trading
formulated in Cady, Roberts, the linchpin in the development of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In Cady, Roberts, SEC Chairman Cary
asserted that "one of the major purposes of the securities acts is the
prevention of fraud, manipulation or deception in connection with
securities transactions."384 But the courts have cast the net of
Rule 10b-5 so broadly that its central focus is no longer "the plight
of the buying public-wholly unprotected from the misuse of special
information."38' The focus is instead on the source of the infor-
mation and on its damages. "The theory grieves for the one
wounded by the theft. But who receives the damages award? Who
is made whole? Not the wounded one, but an unmentioned,
unknown, ignored third party. Do not the 'misappropriation' courts
realize the incongruity?"8 6
3. A Doctrine That Is Confused and Confusing:
Criticisms of the Misappropriation Theory
The divergence of the courts' formulation of the misappropria-
tion theory from the objectives of the securities laws has led to
many criticisms of the theory. Recently, the Fourth Circuit
forcefully and convincingly split with the precedent established by
its sister circuits, rejecting the validity of the misappropriation
theory in United States v. Bryan.387 Bryan, the director of the West
Virginia lottery, manipulated the lottery procedures for awarding
contracts to companies that supplied services to the lottery.
3 8
Prior to the contract awards being announced, Bryan purchased
stock in a company that the lottery had selected to receive an
'ss David C. Bayne, SJ., The Insider's Natural Law Duty: Chestman and the
'Misappropriation Theory', 43 KAN. L. REv. 79, 151 (1994) (quoted without citation).
's Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
3ss Id. at 913.
' Bayne, supra note 383, at 151.
387 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995). In a companion case, United States v. ReBrook,
58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995), the court made clear
that its rejection of the misappropriation theory was categorical and complete, stating
that it "rejected the misappropriation theory as envisioned by [its] sister circuits in
whole, not simply as applied to the particular facts in Bryan." Id. at 966.
's See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 937.
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exclusive contract as a result of Bryan's manipulations.38 9 Bryan
was convicted of securities fraud in violation of section 10(b)
through application of the misappropriation theory because he had
improperly used confidential information that belonged to the
lottery for his own enrichment.
30
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that misappropriation theory
could not be reconciled with the language or purposes of section
10(b) or Rule lOb-5.3 9' The court went on to effectively unravel
the interpretive twine that had ensnared other courts searching for
a theory of liability in similar cases.
Section 10(b)... prohibits only the use of deception, in the form
of material misrepresentations or omissions, to induce action or
inaction by purchasers or sellers of securities, or that affects others
with a vested interest in a securities transaction. In contravention
of this established principle, the misappropriation theory autho-
rizes criminal conviction for simple breaches of fiduciary duty and
similar relationships of trust and confidence, whether or not the
breaches entail deception within the meaning of section 10(b) and
whether or not the parties wronged by the breaches were purchas-
ers or sellers of securities .... Finding no authority for such an
expansion of securities fraud liability-indeed, finding the theory
irreconcilable with applicable Supreme Court precedent-we reject
application of the theory in this circuit. 92
The court defined those transactions that would be within the
penumbra of section 10(b) liability, finding that "the section is
primarily if not exclusively concerned with the deception of
purchasers and sellers of securities, but at most extends to purchas-
ers and sellers, other investors, and persons with a similar stake in
an actual or proposed securities transaction."3 9 A long list of
criticisms can be added to this recent judicial condemnation of
misappropriation theory; criticisms that could be obviated if the
SEC would adopt a rule that would replace judicial application of
the theory.
The most obvious problem with misappropriation theory is
that when material nonpublic information is obtained without a
breach of duty, there is no obligation to disclose or refrain
from trading. 94 In circumstances similar to those in Materia,"'
s See id. at 939.
s See id. at 936.
391 See id. at 944.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 946.
394 See supra part II.C.1.
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had the printing house not promulgated a formal work rule
requiring the confidentiality of information obtained during
the course of employment, no liability would have attached.3 96
Similarly, in Carpenter,397 had the Wall Street Journal, the owner
of the information in the column, traded in securities prior to
publication, it would not have faced Rule 10b-5 liability. 98  It
is even more anomalous that in Willis,3"' had Mrs. Weill told her
hairdresser of her husband's efforts to become CEO and the hair-
dresser had then traded on the information, no liability would
attach. The hairdresser could not be a tippee because Mrs. Weill
had no direct duty to the shareholders of BankAmerica herself nor
an indirect duty through her husband. Furthermore, the hairdress-
er would not have obtained the information in breach of a fiduciary-
type duty, for although a hairdresser's clients may discuss many
things that they expect the hairdresser to keep confidential, no one
could seriously argue that a fiduciary relationship exists. It
violates basic tenets of justice that identical actions, performed
with the same level of culpability, would be treated differently by
the law. Moreover, the effects of the misappropriation theory
contravene the policies of securities regulations and threaten market
integrity.
40 0
The misappropriation theory as it stands today fails to provide
a bright-line rule. Furthermore, the level of duty that must be
breached is unclear. When the misappropriation theory is applied
to impose criminal liability, concerns of vagueness and the
requirements of the Ex Post Facto Clause401 are of special
"' SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 311-19 and accompanying text.
" See Barbara B. Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory ofLiabilityfor Trading
on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 114-15, 122 (1984) (noting that
misappropriation theory is not applicable to one who steals information without an
explicit duty).
... United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S.
19 (1987). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 322-44 and accompanying
text.
" The Court of Appeals in Carpenter denounced "secreting, stealing, [or]
purloining" information, but held that such conduct is a lOb-5 violation only in the
presence of a breach of duty. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031.
'" United States v. Willis, 773 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 778
F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 360-83
and accompanying text.
" See Stefanie A. Boinski, Note, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 215, 236-39 (1987).
'0' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. "A law is unconstitutionally 'ex post facto' if it deprives
the defendant of a defense to criminal liability that he had prior to enactment of the
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importance.40 1  "Unless courts can figure out a way to give an
ambiguous criminal statute an authoritative judicial gloss in
advance, it is not for the federal courts to try to develop the
appropriate 'new paradigm' for criminal insider trading."
40 3
Although the Ex Post Facto clause is not relevant in civil proceed-
ings,40 4 the same concerns of notice are still applicable. As the
Dirks Court stated, "[w]ithout legal limitations, market participants
are forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC's litigation
strategy, but that can be hazardous."
40 5
In addition, when misappropriation theory is applied, the breach
of duty is to the source of the information, not to the party on the
other side of the trade. In Chiarella, the Court was very clear in
holding that "liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction. Thus, while claiming to adhere to a strict interpre-
tation of common law fraud which requires a relationship between
the parties, 40 7 misappropriation theory abandons the common law
in allowing a breach of duty owed to some other person to serve as
the basis of the violation.
Finally, it is only through considerable legal gymnastics that
the misappropriation theory leaps from the requirement of finding
a breach of a duty unrelated to the market, to a holding that
causation of remote and indirect harm to investors in the market
is the basis for Rule 10b-5 liability. Because misappropriation
theory is drawn within the Chiarella doctrine, 408 courts are forced
to search for irrelevant duties in order to find liability. The
proponents of the theory point to the language of Rule 10b-5
that prohibits "fraud or deceit upon any person" when "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security."0 9 But the "con-
nection" between fraud on a source of information unrelated to
law." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 580 (6th ed. 1990).
402 See Neely, supra note 339, at *12.
4 0
3Id. at *11.
404 See id.
405 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 n.24 (1983).
4 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (emphasis added).
417 See supra note 145.
41 Chiarella stands for the proposition that only those who have a fiduciary
duty or stand in a similar relationship of trust and confidence to the shareholders of
the corporation in whose stock they trade are bound by a duty to disclose any
material nonpublic information on which their trade is based. See Chiarella, 445 U.S.
at 235.
4- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
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the market and a subsequent trade on the basis of nonpublic
information causing harm to investors in the market seems too
attenuated. 410  Furthermore, misappropriation theory uses the
breach of a duty as the basis for finding fraud.41 ' For instance,
in Carpenter,42 Foster Winans did not alter the contents of his
articles, so there was no deception or manipulation of the public,
only a theft of information from his employer. 41s This breach
was enough, however, for the Second Circuit to wield section 10(b)
as one aspect of a "'comprehensive yet open-ended statutory
scheme, capable of ongoing adaptation and refinement.'" 4 14 Such
a scheme is directly antithetical to the holding in Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green,415 however, in which the Court was unwilling to
find the mere breach of a fiduciary duty sufficient to sustain a
violation of section 10(b).416  As the Fourth Circuit recently
pointed out:
[B]y its own terms, the misappropriation theory does not even
require deception, but rather, allows the imposition of liability
upon the mere breach of a fiduciary relationship or similar
relationship of trust and confidence. Such a theory obviously
cannot be squared with the holding of Santa Fe Industries that a
breach of fiduciary duty, even in connection with a purchase or
sale of securities, does not give rise to liability under section 10(b),
absent deception.
417
Securities regulations should not focus on a breach of a duty in
acquiring information, but should instead emphasize regulation of
the unfair use of that information.418 Otherwise, the effect of the
securities laws is to criminalize employee work rules and other
duties unrelated to the efficient functioning of the market.
41 See Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 309, at 183 n.290 (citing DANIEL FISCHEL,
PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL
REVOLUI~oN 51 (1995)).
41 See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986), afl'd, 484
U.S. 19 (1987) ("It is sufficient that the fraud was committed upon Winans's
employer.").
412 For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 322-44 and accompanying text.
41s See Cafpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026.
4" Id. at 1036 (quoting SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985)).
415 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
416 See id. at 472-74.
417 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 949 (4th Cir. 1995).
411 See Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Securities Litigation: Insider Trading-
The Need for Legislation, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 350, 371 (1983) (arguing for exceptions to
a general prohibition against trading on material nonpublic information).
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Furthermore, the theft of information from the information source,
while being unethical and reprehensible, is neither fraud nor deceit
unless it involves an affirmative misstatement or a material
omission.'I 9 It is somewhat ironic that the courts fastidiously go
about applying the language of Rule 10b-5 and the requirements of
Chiarella420 to prosecute securities violations, and yet fail to
recognize that misappropriation is not fraud; it is theft.
Although the courts may not recognize misappropriation as a
theft, they have realized that no link exists between the party to
whom the breach relates and those who are actually injured by the
trade. In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,421 the Second Circuit held
that an investor who trades against an insider who misappropriated
information from his corporation does not have a private cause of
action pursuant to the misappropriation theory.4 22 The court held
that the insider does not acquire a duty to disclose to the market as
a result of misappropriating the information.42 3 Instead, the court
maintained that the breach of duty to an employer would establish
only a ground for criminal prosecution by the SEC.424 This
holding demonstrates the ludicrous nature of the connection
between the information misappropriated and the trade. The goal
of the securities laws, the protection of investors, becomes merely
derivative as the harm combated is one that lands upon
noninvestors.
4. More Recent Federal Legislation
Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
("ITSA")425 in response to increasing violations of the Exchange
Act.426 The ITSA subjects violators to disgorgement of up to
three times the profits received from the illegal trade.42 7
419 See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 145, § 32:18.
420 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-35 (1980) (noting that an
affirmative duty to disclose material inside information arises from a relationship of
trust and confidence between the parties to a transaction). For a further discussion
of Chiarella, see supra notes 231-52 and accompanying text.
421 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
41 See id. at 16.
423 See id. "As defendants owed no duty of disclosure to plaintiff Moss, they
committed no 'fraud' in purchasing shares of Deseret stock." Id.
424 See id. at 13.
425 Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c,
78o, 78t, 78u, 78ff (1994)).
426 See Laura Ryan, Comment, Rule 14e-3"s Disclose or Abstain Rule and Its Validity
Under Section 14(e), 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 449, 492-93 (1991).
427 15 U.S.C § 78u-l(a)(2) (originally codified at 15 U.S.C. 78u, but amended by
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To provide "greater deterrence, detection and punishment of
violations of insider trading,"4 28 Congress subsequently enacted
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
("ITSFEA").4 29 When an investor has purchased or sold securities
while in possession of material nonpublic information "through the
facilities of a national securities exchange" or through a broker-
dealer, the SEC may commence an action.43 The ITSFEA amended
section 20A of the 1934 Act to provide a private cause of action
under the misappropriation theory in specific response to the Moss
decision. 3 ' In light of the express private right of action that
these two statutes give to contemporaneous traders in the market,
it is more important now that Congress, or the SEC under its
rulemaking powers, develop a bright-line definition of insider
trading. In United States v. Chestman,432 Judge Newman questioned
the SEC: "'If you're as concerned as you say, why don't you
promulgate a rule telling us what insider trading is?'"433 The
reply, "'It is too daunting a task to define fraud.'"
434
III. THE BETrER WAY TO FILL THE HOLE:
A REGULATORY SOLUTION
Cases such as Chiarella,435 Carpenter,436 and Materia43 7 dem-
onstrate that certain uses of illegally obtained material nonpublic
ITSFEA in 1988).
428 HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING AND S.E.C. FRAUD
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044 [hereinafter INSIDER TRADING REPORT].
42 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1
(1994)).
480 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(1).
431 See INSIDER TRADING REPORT, supra note 428, at 7 (noting that the ITSFEA
"embodies a series of statutory changes the Committee views as necessary to enhance
deterrence against insider trading"), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6044.
4S2 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
4" Deborah Squiers, En Banc Review of Key Securities Ruling, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 13,
1990, at 1, 2; see also Mitchell Pacelle & EllenJ. Pollock, Insider Trading Case Gets Rare
Review By Full Appeals Court, WALL ST.J., Nov. 12, 1990, at B5 (discussing the Second
Circuit's review of Chestman).
4s Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Chestman Revisited: The Slow Death of Fraud, INSIGHTS,
Jan. 1992, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
M Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For a discussion of this case,
see supra notes 231-52 and accompanying text.
"' Carpenter v. United States, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affid, 484 U.S. 19
(1987). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 322-44 and accompanying text.
417 SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 311-19 and accompanying text.
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information and improper uses of legally obtained information are
unfair to investors in the securities markets. Clearly, the defendants
in these cases should be punished because their "informational
advantage [was] obtained by conversion and not by legitimate
economic activity that society seeks to encourage." 438  In cases
such as these, an expansive interpretation of Rule 10b-5 may in fact
be the best solution. Although the "misappropriation theory may
be an ill-fitting invention ... the result it achieves-imposing a
measure of fair play in the markets that was lost in the doctrinal
rigidity of Chiarella's abstain or disclose approach-accords with the
investor confidence building intent of the securities laws gen-
erally."4 M9 However, this rule was "not designed to combat every
unfair situation accompanying securities transactions."440 The
desire of the judiciary to craft a tool in the absence of a clear
definition of insider trading by the SEC that would produce liability
in the circumstances of these cases has led to an inadequate and
unworkable doctrine. Concerns about investor confidence can be
more effectively addressed through the adoption of a new rule that
provides clear guidance to the investor.
To promote efficient capital markets, regulation of insider
trading must maintain an incentive for the thorough analysis of
information. 441  The parity-of-information theory announced in
Texas Gulf Sulphur,442 requiring that all traders have equivalent
information, clearly was too broad.443  Even an equal-access
theory, requiring that all investors have at least equal access to
information, even if all are not equally informed, was rejected by
the Court in Chiarella.4 44
48 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 242 n.3.
139 Langevoort, supra note 308, at 1297-98.
440 Edward Douma, Comment, The Misappropriation Theouy: Too Much of a Good
Thing?, 17 PAC. LJ. 111, 127 (1985).
441 It is only through the gathering and analysis of information that the market is
able to correctly price a security. When all available information is discounted into
the price of a security, the market is efficient as to that security in the semistrong
form. See supra part I.A.3; see also Jill E. Fisch, Picking a Winner, 20J. CORP. L. 451,
451 (1995) ("[A]n efficient market responds to and incorporates new information into
stock prices.").
442 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). For a discussion of this case, seesupra notes 189-211
and accompanying text.
"4 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (noting that "neither
Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule").
41 See id. at 235 n.20; supra note 248 and accompanying text.
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Yet, a refusal to adopt either a parity-of-information or equal-
access theory to govern insider trading will undermine investor
confidence in the market if individuals who are routinely able to
obtain inside information are permitted to trade on that basis.
445
Investors will compensate for the risk that others in the market are
more effectively able to value securities by demanding higher
returns, resulting in increased transaction costs, both for individuals
and corporations. 446 To rectify these inefficiencies, a regulatory
definition of insider trading must be broad enough to encompass
activities that undermine investor confidence. However, the
misappropriation theory is not the proper peg to fill the hole.
The misappropriation theory attempts to achieve an equitable
result by holding outsiders who breach a duty and trade on the basis
of nonpublic information liable.447  In so doing, the theory is
unevenly applied to equally culpable actors. 448  To compound
matters, the misappropriation theory is defined insufficiently to
place law-abiding investors on notice, resulting in traders being
criminally convicted for activities that at the time "present[ed]
judicial issues of first impression." 4 ' The ultimate result, however,
may be that investors will be hesitant to act on information that
originates from an unknown source; an outcome similar to that
achieved by implementing the parity-of-information theory.450
Accordingly, a regulatory definition of insider trading must
encompass like actions and must provide a bright-line rule for
liability.
The Commission should use its rulemaking power under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act451 to define more clearly those actions
that constitute fraud in connection with a securities transaction;
particularly those in which a traditional corporate fiduciary
relationship is absent. The new rule should "'focus on policing
insiders and what they do... rather than on policing information
per se and its possession."' 4 2 In other words, by defining which
445 See INSIDER TRADING REPORT, supra note 428, at 14, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N at 6051.4 6 See supra part I.B.l.b.
447 See supra part II.C.1.
44See supra part II.C.3.
411 Fisch, supra note 55, at 181; see also supra part II.C.3.4
15 ee supra note 201.
451 See supra note 23.
452 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) (quoting Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C.
633, 648 (1971)).
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individuals are not able to take advantage of material nonpublic
information, the definition will provide bright-line rules.
Those who are unable to trade on the basis of inside informa-
tion should be those for whom the possession of the information
provides bad incentives:... those who are able to delay the issuance
of the information so that they will have the opportunity to trade;
those who are able to control the performance of the corporation
so that they can purposefully cause a poor performance and
subsequently profit on the bad news; those who are in a position to
manipulate market prices through the publication of financial
information or by affecting the performance of another corporation,
for example, by cancelling an important contract. It logically
follows that tippees of these people should also be precluded from
trading to prevent the type of quid pro quo arrangement that
concerned the Court in Dirks.
45 4
The courts have now effectively identified those individuals that
are included within the definition of a traditional insider con-
sistent with the language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 55
Attempting to codify this exhaustive interpretive history would
add little to the field of insider trading regulation. As this
Comment has demonstrated, however, the courts have failed
to develop a workable rule to regulate trading by those who do
not fit within the definition of a traditional insider. Currently,
traditional-theory insiders include those who have fiduciary duties
to, or a similar relationship with, a corporation and its share-
holders and the tippees of those insiders.4 6 This includes direc-
tors, officers, and the beneficial owner of more than ten percent of
any class of equity security of the corporation." 7 Section 3(a)(7)
411 See supra part I.B.l.b-.2.
" See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.
4" The traditional theory of insider trading rests upon the Supreme Court's
decisions in Chiarella and Dirks.
" This theory provides that a person violates Rule 10b-5 if he purchases or sells
securities on the basis of material nonpublic information and if that person "(1) owes
a fiduciary or similar duty to the other party to the transaction; (2)... is an insider
of the corporation in whose shares he trades, and thus owes a fiduciary duty to the
corporation's shareholders; or (3)... is a tippee who received his information from
an insider of the corporation and knows or should know that the insider breached a
fiduciary duty in disclosing the information to him." SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,443
(9th Cir. 1990).
""' The language of§ 16(a), regarding the traditional holders of fiduciary duties,
is as follows:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
of the Exchange Act defines a director as "any director of a corpora-
tion or any person performing similar functions with respect to any
organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated.""' An
officer is a "president, vice-president, secretary, treasury or principal
financial officer, . . . and any person routinely performing corre-
sponding functions with respect to any organization whether
incorporated or unincorporated."45' Traditional-theory insiders
also include employees of a company who obtain material nonpublic
information about their employer by virtue of their employment.
Even though they may not have formal fiduciary duties to the
corporation, employees are included within the definition of
traditional insider because they are encompassed within the
language of Chiarella, which includes those who share "'a similar
relation of trust and confidence'" with the corporation within its
definition of "insider."
4 60
The new category of insider should be added to those insiders
already covered by the traditional theory currently encompassed
security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or who is
a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time
of the registration of such security on a national securities exchange or the
effective date of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 7 8l(g) of
this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner,
director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and if such security
is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the exchange), of
the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the
beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month
thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month,
shall file with the Commission (and, if such security is registered on a
national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange) a statement
indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p(a) (1994).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1994).
459 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1995). An administrative view announced that:
Generally, it is not difficult to identify a company's principal officers by
their traditional titles and functions. However, an employee who does not
possess a title may nevertheless be an officer because of the significant
functions he performs; similarly, an employee who holds a title may
nonetheless not be an officer because his functions and duties are
insignificant, despite his formal position. The staff gnerally [sic] takes the
view that anyone holding an appropriate title is an officer for purposes of
Section 16(a).
Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading, Exchange
Act Release No. 18,114, 23 S.E.C. Docket 856, 860-61 (Sept. 24, 1981).
"' Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
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within the Chiarella and Dirks holdings in determining liability for
insider trading." 1 Accordingly, the new definition should codify
the solution to the problem that the courts have attempted to
address via the misappropriation theory. The new definition should
not fully adopt the judicial morass that resulted in the misappropria-
tion theory, however. Instead, the rule should be tailored to
address the principles that undergirded the development of
securities regulation.
46 2
To begin, the new definition should include those who are
defined in Dirks as quasi-insiders: 461 those who are employed by
the corporation or have another contractual relationship with the
corporation by which they receive material nonpublic information.
Specifically, this classification would include lawyers, invest-
ment bankers, underwriters, accountants, and consultants who
are given corporate information for the purpose of advising
management or providing other services to the corporation.
46 4
These people obtain information by virtue of a structural position
within the market465 and should not be able to exploit that advan-
tage.
A second tier of insider that should be covered by the scope
of the new rule would include those persons who are employed
or associated with companies that provide information or serv-
ices relating to the securities markets; for example, tele-
vision stations, newspapers, producers of financial newsletters,
and financial printers. Any of these persons who receive
inside information from their employer or in the course of
their employment should be prohibited from trading on the basis
of that information. This approach would establish an equal-
access theory4 66 of insider trading only as to those whose employ-
ers have predefined ties to the securities markets. These are the
people with whom the misappropriation theory has been predomi-
nately concerned. 467  They are in a position that is unique in
that they are more than just innocent bystanders who happen
to overhear a conversation. They are, in effect, in a posi-
"" See supra parts II.B.3-.4.
462 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
463 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
464 See id.
465 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 251 (1980).
411 See supra note 206.
41 See supra part II.C.2.
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tion similar to that of the quasi-insider defined in Dirks,468
because they too have obtained information by virtue of a struc-
tural position within the market. Their position just happens to be
one removed from a fiduciary relationship to the corporate
stockholders.
Finally, it should be a violation of the new rule for any of the
above-named groups to tip; that is, to relay the inside information
to others who otherwise would be permitted to trade. Again, under
the Dirks rationale, tippees of those covered under the new rule
would also be prohibited from trading.
469
How would this proposal affect the court decisions that have
applied or proposed application of the misappropriation theory dis-
cussed earlier?47' Defendants such as Chiarella, Materia, and Win-
ans would all be precluded from trading on any material nonpublic
information that they learned from their employer or in the course
of their employment. Defendants in the position of Dr. Willis, or
Mrs. Weill's hairdresser in the proposed hypothetical, 47' however,
would not be precluded from trading on inside information unless
they had a preexisting relationship with the corporate shareholders.
That is, these defendants would be able to trade unless they occu-
pied some other position or filled some other role that would make
them a corporate insider under the Chiarella analysis. Their posi-
tion in the market is closer to that of the innocent bystander who
overhears a conversation, or the tippee who sustains no liability
because the "tip" does not fall within the Dirks definition of a tip
that carries with it a fiduciary duty to shareholders.4 72 According-
ly, liability should not attach to them because the relationship
between them and their "tipper" is unrelated to the securities
market.
Likewise, Matt Pilfer, the travel agent introduced in the opening
hypothetical, would not be liable under the new regulatory defini-
tion. Pilfer is not employed by a company that provides informa-
tion or services relating to the securities markets, nor does he owe
any fiduciary duties to the shareholders of IBM.
46 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
See supra notes 276-84 and accompanying text.
See supra part II.C.2.
4'71 See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
47 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 ("[T]he test is whether the insider personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there
has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider,
there is no derivative breach.").
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CONCLUSION
It appears that Congress, the SEC, and commentators are
beginning to agree that a regulatory definition of insider trading is
necessary.4 7 3 In attempting to define this so-far elusive activity,
however, Congress and the courts should not focus on the source
of the information, but should instead analyze the status of the
parties within the market. Doing so will provide a bright-line rule
that gives traders adequate notice, will promote the free flow of
information to the market, and will continue to provide incentives
for analysts to ferret out information and attempt to successfully
arbitrage securities based on superior information.
171 See Fisch, supra note 55, at 235.
